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IMPLICATIONS OF SECOND-BEST THEORY FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE AND REGULATORY LAW:
A CASE STUDY OF PUBLIC UTILITY
REGULATION
When confronted with a problem, many of us have a simple reac-
tion-do something! We want to help, particularly when we confront
facts which set forth compelling stories of personal hardship, lost op-
portunity, or senseless waste. If we know how to fix a problem, we
should roll up our sleeves and fix it. When we confront larger
problems, "something" often turns out to be passing a law or writing a
regulation to address the problem systematically. In these circum-
stances, a useful question which might be asked before embarking on
a new policy is "How do we know what we are doing will produce the
outcome we seek?"
Answering that question requires considering the problem posed
by economists R.G. Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster nearly forty years
ago. Examining the realistic case of an economy with multiple imper-
fections, Lipsey and Lancaster demonstrated that
if one of the Paretian optimum conditions cannot be fulfilled a sec-
ond-best optimum situation is achieved only by departing from all
other optimum conditions.... in general, nothing can be said about
the direction or the magnitude of the secondary departures from
optimum conditions made necessary by the original non-fufillment
of one condition.'
Lipsey and Lancaster's analysis reaches far beyond partial equilibrium
economic policy analyses because virtually all regulatory problems are
essentially constrained optimization problems, whether expressed
mathematically or not.
Compared to early twentieth century policy analysts, we have
available today extensive tools of "comparative institutional analy-
sis,''2 increasingly sophisticated economic models,3 vastly increased
and widely distributed computing power, and gigabytes of data. De-
spite all this, we simply have not come to grips with the implications of
second-best theory for regulatory interventions. Moreover, policy
must address not only the economic implications of second-best the-
ory but the legal and political implications as well: policymakers must
1. R.G. Lipsey & R.K. Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON.
STUD. 11, 12 (1956-57).
2. See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES (1994).
3. See, e.g., JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PRO-
CUREMENT AND REGULATION (1993).
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consider the interaction of potential shortcomings of the legal and
political tools available when they design the solutions to be imple-
mented with those tools.
The failure to confront second-best theory's implications is
rooted in the foundations of the regulatory state-an inappropriate
confidence in our ability to forecast the impacts of regulation and pre-
cisely calibrate regulatory interventions. This overconfidence is based
on three, interconnected factual assertions: (1) technical expertise can
design solutions to social problems; (2) legal constraints can ensure
technical expertise is properly applied; and (3) political institutions
will produce legal constraints which correctly guide and restrain tech-
nical experts. All three are false.
The reasons why the challenge of second-best theory has been
ignored are varied. An "engineering" approach to economics based
on first-best analysis is seductive in many respects-it relies on elegant
mathematical constructs whose solutions are intellectually gratifying
and demanding, it allows economists to play important roles in public
policy debates, and the analysis leads to (relatively) clear answers. In-
stitutional details can be assumed away and the intellectual history of
the discipline safely ignored,4 vastly simplifying economists' lives.5
Second-best analysis, on the other hand, is messy and requires thor-
ough knowledge of the details of the actual operation of the economy
and society. Perhaps public choice analysis explains a great deal
about academic life as well as about governments. For whatever rea-
sons, policymakers and analysts have largely ignored second-best the-
ory. In particular, the implications of second-best theory are ignored
by those analyzing and designing regulatory policies justified largely
by goals related to economic efficiency, as in utility regulation.
Second-best theory suggests an important limitation on regula-
tory policy: because the ultimate impacts of regulatory actions are dif-
4. In my own economics training, for example, only a few of my graduate courses included
a significant number of readings published before 1980, and many included nothing published
more than ten years earlier. Two of those exceptional courses were taught by faculty whose own
work was well outside the mainstream of the department (and who were also both particularly
gifted teachers) and who have since left the school. Not only did MIT not offer a graduate
history of economic thought course, but perhaps most amazingly, my formal education included
nothing by critically important thinkers like Friedrich Hayek and Joan Robinson, to take two
ideological extremes.
5. The most famous example of this tendency is recounted in Ronald Coase's article on the
use of the lighthouse as an example of public goods. R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics,
in R.H. COASE, THE FiRm, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 187 (1988). Coase demonstrates how
British lighthouses were often private ventures until the late nineteenth century. See id. He also
demonstrates how Paul Samuelson's ahistorical analysis of lighthouses led him to the error of
concluding they were a paradigm of public goods. See id. at 188-91.
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ficult and expensive to discover, we must be cautious in acting to "fix"
what we perceive to be "inefficiencies." We should be modest about
our ability to understand the world, our ability to design legal institu-
tions which can implement solutions, and our political institutions' ca-
pability to produce laws. In particular, we should be suspicious of
claims that regulatory actions will enhance economic efficiency. One
important role for public policy, aside from preventing fraud and the
use of force, is to disrupt rent seeking behavior. This does not mean
there is no room for policy; it does mean that there is much less room
than appears from much of the legal and economic literature.
In the next section, I describe the public utility regulatory prob-
lem which I will use as the basis of the analysis. In the following sec-
tions I examine each of the three assumptions described above and
show why they are false. In the final section, I suggest an alternative
approach.
I. NATURAL MONOPOLY AND PUBLIC UTILITIES
The story of public utility regulation encompasses all three of the
assumptions described above. It is, of course, a complex story with a
rich institutional context, which I can only sketch here. The outline of
this history presented attempts to tell enough of the story to enable
evaluation of my claims about regulatory policy. 6
6. I attempt to outline the history of regulatory efforts, relevant legal doctrines, and intel-
lectual debates over regulation. To do so in a concise fashion requires some sacrifice in compre-
hensiveness of footnotes, so I have selected sources based on their importance and
representativeness rather than burden the reader (and editors) with exhaustive and repetitive
citations. A brief justification of my selections will assist the reader in evaluating my choices.
For the pre-World War II period, I rely primarily upon MARTIN G. GLAESER, OUTLINES OF
PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS (1927). Glaeser's book is part of a series issued under the editor-
ship of Richard Ely. The series generally, and Glaeser's work in particular, reflects the influence
of the Wisconsin-institutional school of economics identified with John R. Commons.
For the period between 1945 and 1970, 1 rely heavily upon the work of James C. Bonbright,
particularly his 1961 treatise PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES [hereinafter BoNRIGirrr].
Bonbright was "one of the legendary pioneers in the field of public-utility economics" and "ad-
dressed virtually all of the problems that confronted policymakers from the early 1920s to the
mid-1960s." Harry M. Trebing, James C. Bonbright's Contributions to Public-Utility Economics
and Regulation, in CURRENT ISSUES IN PUBLIC-UTILITY ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
JAMES C. BONBRIGHT 3 (Albert L. Danielsen & David R. Kamerschen eds., 1983). Bonbright
was both an analyst and an important player in regulatory debates, heavily influencing the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. See id. Like Glaeser, Bonbright came out of the Wiscon-
sin-Commons-Institutionalist school, although Bonbright's work focused more on marginal cost
pricing than did Glaeser's. See id. at 4.
For the 1970s and 1980s, I rely heavily on the work of Professor Michael Crew and a series
of conference volumes he edited. These conferences involved many of the major academic
figures who focused on utility issues. A 1988 literature survey cited Crew's edited volumes, as
well as the Danielsen and Kamerschen edited volumes, as important sources of primary source
material. See SANFORD V. BERG & JOHN TSCHIRHART, NATURAL MONOPOLY REGULATION X
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For over a century governments in the United States and else-
where subjected a shifting set of industries, ranging from grain eleva-
tors to energy to transportation, to various forms of social control as
public utilities.7 For these industries
the primary guarantor of acceptable performance is conceived to be
(whatever it is in truth) not competition or self-restraint but direct
government controls-over entry (and in many instances exit), and
price, and conditions of service-exercised by administrative com-
missions constituted for this specific purpose.8
Although there have been a wide variety of rationales for social con-
trol of these industries, 9 the dominant explanation has been that these
industries are "natural monopolies." 10
(1988). In addition, I used Alfred Kahn's ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, published in 1970, as a
source for the 1970s because Kahn's influential role as regulator and theorist made his book of
greater prospective importance than its publication date suggests. Finally, I used STEPHEN
BROWN & DAVID SIBLEY, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC UTILITY PRICING (1986), a comprehensive
survey of utility pricing theory in the 1980s.
More general works have also proven invaluable. George Priest's survey of the intellectual
history of theories of regulation was a welcome guide to the economic literature on regulation
generally, a literature which often used utility issues as examples. George L. Priest, The Origins
of Utility Regulation and the "Theories of Regulation" Debate, 36 J.L. & ECON. 289 (1993).
Priest's article allows me to considerably compress my own discussion of the intellectual history
of utility regulation.
Finally, the legal analysis draws heavily upon the many insightful works of Richard Pierce.
Pierce's analysis of changes in regulatory law is not only influential and the most complete but
also among the most accessible to those uninitiated in the intricacies of such mysteries as FERC
orders. Teaching from his text on regulatory law assisted greatly in refining a number of these
points. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ECONOMIC REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (1994).
7. In the United States these industries have been largely structured as regulated, privately
owned corporations; elsewhere they have been mostly structured as publicly owned and con-
trolled firms.
8. 1 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUlONS
10 (Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1988) (1970); see also BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 10
(["i]t is the general consensus of economists that the primary, even though not the sole, distin-
guishing feature of a public utility enterprise is to be found in a technology of production and
transmission which almost inevitably leads to a complete or partial monopoly of the market for
the service.").
9. There are many other rationales as well: destructive competition, information
problems, and the existence of externalities, to name but a few.
10. See KEITH M. HOWE & EUGENE F. RASMUSSEN, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS AND Fi-
NANCE 1-2, 19 (1982) ("public utilities are frequently natural monopolies, and vice versa," and
natural monopoly status is "a chief economic justification for extensive regulation"); see also
JOHN H. GRAY & JACK LEVIN, THE VALUATION AND REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 5
(1933) (regulation of utilities "has its roots in the necessity of protecting the users of their essen-
tial services from monopolistic exploitation."). Of course under the Supreme Court's rather
elastic interpretation of the Constitution in this area, almost any industry can be regulated, sub-
ject only to due process. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536-37 (1934) ("there can be no
doubt that upon proper occasion and by appropriate measures the state may regulated a busi-
ness in any of its aspects, including the prices to be charged for the products or commodities it
sells."). Simply labeling something a "natural monopoly" obviously ought not to end the discus-
sion, even if it sometimes does. As Kahn notes, "the interesting economic questions" are not
whether industries are "natural monopolies" but things like
1998]
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This rationale, has posed to regulators the problem of capturing
the benefits of a natural monopoly (lowered costs with a single sup-
plier) without incurring the costs a monopolist would impose upon the
economy generally and consumers in particular (monopoly profits).
The conceptually simple-but difficult to implement-solution prof-
fered by economists is to operate the utility's production side as a mo-
nopoly but force the utility to sell its product at an "efficient" price."
The importance of natural monopolies reaches well beyond the
public utility context. George Priest's recent review of the "theories
of regulation" debate, for example, notes that industries that are natu-
ral monopolies
have traditionally provided the strongest public interest justification
for regulation. In addition to any noneconomic goals, regulation
seemingly can achieve the powerful economic goal of constraining
monopoly pricing toward marginal cost in order to enhance social
welfare. Indeed, this social welfare justification is so widely ac-
What makes them so? Is natural monopoly synonymous with long-run decreasing cost
tendencies? If so, what about the public utilities such as the supply of water, that seem
to be characterized by long-run tendencies to increasing costs? Does a tendency to
increasing costs? Does a tendency for costs to decline over time constitute an evidence
of natural monopoly? What parts of these industries are natural monopolies, what
parts not? Might they be natural monopolies in some static, efficiency sense but "un-
natural" ones in terms of the prerequisites for innovation and growth? And how then
do we handle, in theory and in practice, the growing competition between "natural
monopolists"... ? And how do we cope with the historical fact that the prime historic
exemplars of the extension of public utility regulation in the United States in the last
quarter of the nineteenth century-railroads and grain elevators-were not really natu-
ral monopolies?
KAIN, supra note 8, at 12.
11. See BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 37 (arguing "that the basic standards of measurable
rates should be primarily standards of functional efficiency"); see also Northern Natural Gas Co.
v. Federal Power Commission, 399 F.2d 953, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (noting that regulators' goal is
to replicate a competitive marketplace). However, social control is rarely limited to a single
objective. Even with a benign view of regulators' objectives, it is easy to see how powerful the
temptation is to use the levers of power to correct additional market failures. For example,
reduction of environmental externalities (shifting away from burning "dirty" coal), redistribution
(subsidization of small users), and enhanced national security (energy independence) all can be
accomplished, at least in theory, through utility regulation.
The institutions selected to produce this outcome vary almost from country to country, sug-
gesting "the unsettled nature of the debate on how society can best balance the costs and bene-
fits of monopoly regulation." Bridger M. Mitchell & Paul R. Kleindorfer, Public Enterprise and
Regulation in International Perspective, in REGULATED INDUSTRIES AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 3
(Bridger M. Mitchell & Paul R. Kleindorfer eds., 1980). Regulators continually express confi-
dence in their ability to improve on market outcomes. A former high level Federal Communica-
tions Commission ("FCC") regulator, for example, described regulation's role as being
"designed to operate more efficiently and effectively than competition. It can pinpoint specific
problems or issues and cure them." Asher H. Ende, Administrative Reform and the Regulatory
Process, in PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION: CHANGE AND SCOPE 72-73 (Werner Sichel & Thomas
G. Gies eds., 1975). However, even a proponent of utility regulation like Bonbright conceded
that utility rate making "is almost unique in the extreme vagueness of its verbal norm and in the
highly indirect and unproveable relationship between changes in utility rate-making policies and
effects on social welfare, however defined." BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 27 (footnote omitted).
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cepted that the natural monopoly case is viewed'as the prototypical
context for government regulation. Virtually all public interest jus-
tifications for regulation in industries not characterized by natural
monopoly consist of claims that the alleged market imperfection in
the particular industry will generate an effect resembling natural
monopoly. 12
If the three factual assertions listed above are false for the case of
natural monopoly, then, they also are likely to be false for those mar-
ket failures which are derived from natural monopoly-like claims.
A. The Problem and Opportunity of "Natural Monopoly"
The Merchants' Association of New York City memorialized the
New York state legislature in 1905 with a litany of complaints about
the monopolization of gas and electric service in New York City: Mo-
nopolies prevented competition,13 charged excessive prices, 14 overcap-
italized, 15 used city property without just compensation, 6 underpaid
taxes,' 7 dominated city government,' 8 and delivered poor quality ser-
vice. 19 As a result, the merchants concluded,
[iun whatever guise, however masked, the monster monopoly in con-
trol of lights and subways in Manhattan has thus far succeeded in
frustrating all efforts of the city and of private consumers to escape
from its exactions .... If the conditions herein portrayed exist-if
they are even partially true-the people of the City of New York and
the city itself, thus preyed upon and distressed, are, upon the plain-
est principles, entitled to relief from the Legislature of the State.20
In the years since 1905, the language has changed but the complaints
remain the same-monopolies in the utility industry and elsewhere
act like, well, monopolies.2 '
12. Priest, supra note 6, at 295-96.
13. See The Merchant's Association of New York, FOR AN INVESTIGATION OF THE CONDI-
TIONS SURROUNDING GAS AND ELECTRIC LIGHTING IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK (Jan. 11, 1905),
at 3.
14. See id. at 4 (reporting that lamp prices in Manhattan more than 160% of prices in cities
with competitive supplies).
15. See id. at 4-5 (companies "immensely overcapitalized").
16. See id. at 14.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 11-12.
19. See id. at 5-6 (claiming that gas provided by Brooklyn Union Gas Company has an
effect on consumers' eyes "pernicious in the extreme. The light appears to decrease in an inverse
ratio to the size of the combination and the amount of its profits.").
20. Id. at 14-15.
21. See, e.g., Clyde Lyndon King, The Need for Regulation, in THE REGULATION OF MUNIC-
IPAL UTILITIES 3, 12-22 (Clyde Lyndon King ed., 1912) (describing long list of ills caused by
unregulated utilities ranging from high rates to political corruption) [hereinafter King, The Need
for Regulation]. This view of monopolies in general, and natural monopolies in particular, was
not universally held even among economists. Thomas Hazlett concludes his survey of nine-
teenth-century economic analysis of monopolies with the observation that
1998]
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At the same time that the victims of monopolies were calling out
for legal remedies, many economists and regulators saw natural mo-
nopolies not just as villains but also as opportunities. Martin
Glaeser's 753-page "outline" of public utility economics published in
1927 typifies the pre-World War II economic literature on public utili-
ties in stating that
[w]hile most discussions of monopoly approach the problem from
the point of view of the monopolistic control over price, it is impor-
tant to note that monopoly is also a way of organizing production,
which has its own peculiar advantages. This is our chief interest in it
from the point of view of public utility economics. It is, of course,
important to understand the theory of monopoly price so that we
may know why a monopolist is in a position to increase his gains
over and above what would come to him if he were required to sell
in competition with other equally efficient producers. This provides
the economic reason why the monopolists' power over the prices
which he may charge consumers must be limited by regulation. But
it is equally important to understand the advantages of monopolistic
organization of an industry which operates as a public utility and is
thus limited by law in its power over prices. In the latter case, mo-
nopoly operates as a beneficent principle of organization which
makes possible the conservation of productive capacity, the limita-
tion of profit and the systematizing of rates. 22
The regulation of natural monopolies offered a seemingly irresis-
tible opportunity to gain enormous social benefits. The capture of the
production efficiencies of the natural monopoly industries, however
defined, would produce a surplus that regulators could then simply
distribute or expend on other social needs.2 3 Indeed, the problem
there were at least two distinct schools of thought in the early days of large-scale indus-
try. One accepted the newer market forces simply as empirical amendments to the
traditional Ricardian view of competition as the omnipresent and beneficent regulator
of economic activity. Another strain soon developed that opposed and eclipsed this
view. This latter school discarded the universality of the competitive assumption, fo-
cusing on instances in which competition was thought to be too weak a regulator to
maximize consumer welfare. In the United States, this view would materialize from
two premises: that large corporations were, as concentrations of great wealth, immoral
in a strongly normative sense; and, in a positive framework, that in particular natural
monopoly markets, competition was not an efficient but a wasteful allocator of
resources.
Thomas Hazlett, The Curious Evolution of Natural Monopoly Theory, in UNNATURAL MONOPO-
LIES: THE CASE FOR DEREGULATING PUBLIC UTILITIES 6-7 (Robert W. Poole, Jr. ed., 1985)
(footnote omitted).
22. GLAESER, supra note 6, at 634.
23. The desirability of such an outcome seemed so clear to some that as late as 1982 a
survey of regulatory reform and public utilities included a chapter by a distinguished economist
arguing competition in the U.S. telecommunications market was impossible because of the natu-
ral monopoly in the "core, switched telecommunications network." Almarin Phillips, The Im-
possibility of Competition in Telecommunications: Public Policy Gone Awry, in REGULATORY
REFoRm AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 30 (Michael A. Crew ed., 1982).
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seemed so simple that in his 1927 text, Glaeser worried that all the
intellectual challenge had gone out of regulatory matters.2 4 Imple-
menting the policies suggested by economic analysis, however, proved
more difficult. Actually setting rates required enormous amounts of
data and immense effort focused on cost-analysis. "[I]n the roaring
twenties, the rate engineers of the electric-utility industry were busy
grinding out articles about allocating capacity costs, gauging peak re-
sponsibility, and sharing diversity benefits." 25
Between World War II and 1970, aptly termed "an era of stabil-
ity" 26 for both the regulators and regulated in the public utility field,
the economic approach to questions of "natural monopoly" continued
to center on a "technical engineering framework" built around declin-
ing average cost.27 One author summed up state regulators' task
before the 1970s as "essentially one of distributing among rate payers
the benefits of the progressively higher efficiencies achieved by utility
managers. Not bad work if you can get it.''28 Implementation became
increasingly complex as the advent of computers in the 1950s allowed
utility managers "to arrange a utility's costs in infinite patterns of in-
creasing complexity" producing "[t]he two-pound cost-of-service
study," which served "as the empirical, often impressive, and some-
times opaque basis for rate design. ' 29 Nevertheless,
[r]ate increases during these years were moderate, offset by rate de-
creases attributed in large part to technological improvements
which resulted in economies of scale that produced generally lower
unit costs. No customer suffered from inadequate supply of [natu-
ral] gas or electrical energy. Capacity reserves were good. A new
generating station could be planned, approved by regulatory au-
24. See GLAESER, supra note 6, at 752. "Commissions no longer bear aspects of novelty;
they have, accordingly, lost much of the original glamour which attended their establishment."
Id.
25. Robert G. Uhler, Electric-Utility Pricing Issues: Old and New, in CURRENT ISSUES IN
PUBLIC-UTILrrY ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 77-
78.
26. Werner Sichel & Thomas G. Gies, Introduction to PUBLIC UTILrrY REGULATION:
CHANGE AND SCOPE, supra note 11, at xiii [hereinafter Sichel & Gies, Introduction]. Despite the
greater volume of data, however, a 1983 summary concluded that "the basic logic of costing for
rate making had not changed much in some thirty-five years." Uhler, supra note 25, at 78. Bon-
bright, similarly, concluded his 1961 text's overview of rate-level determinations by noting that
all jurisdictions applied essentially the same principles regardless of the labels and differing only
in administration. See BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 282-83.
27. Hazlett, supra note 21, at 9.
28. The author is Howard Perry, quoted in Charles F. Phillips, Jr., The Changing Environ-
ment of Public Utility Regulation: An Overview, in CURRENT ISSUES IN PUBLIC-UTILITY ECO-
NOMICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 34 [hereinafter Charles F.
Phillips, Jr., The Changing Environment].
29. Uhler, supra note 25, at 78.
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thority, financed, and constructed without delay and generally with
public approbation. 30
Economic analysis of the "natural monopoly problem" also continued
to view the "class of firms in.similar product markets as homogene-
ous."' 31 This assumption played an important role in the natural mo-
nopoly argument for regulation because, as Thomas Hazlett points
out,
the entire rationale for competition's being an efficient regulator of
economic activity points to its role as a selection process sorting dif-
ferentiated firms. It is difficult indeed to construct a viable rationale
for competitive behavior, and the duplicative effort (here by defini-
tion) it expends, should the assumption that firms are identical be
consistently employed. It is not surprising, therefore, that the natu-
ral monopoly model has, on these terms, successfully convinced
scholars of the waste of market rivalry for nearly a century. 32
The post-war stability in regulatory theory allowed utility-regula-
tion theorists like James C. Bonbright to take a broad view of utility
regulation, in which rates served four broad social purposes: "(1) the
producer-motivation or capital attraction function; (2) the efficiency-
incentive function; (3) the demand-control or consumer-rationing
function; and (4) the income-distributive function. ' 33 Although these
functions were in "partial conflict," Bonbright thought "a large mea-
sure of harmony" among them was possible if regulators based rates
on cost,34 justifying starting with a "rebuttable presumption in favor of
so-called 'business principles' of rate making. ' 35 Such rates "
may be designed, at one and the same time, (a) to make the enter-
prise self-supporting and to attract required new investment, (b) to
restrict demand, and (c) to secure a return flow of cash consistent
with the income-distributive function of prices .... Even the effi-
ciency-incentive function of prices can be given some recognition,
through flexible features in regulation ....
Any conflicts between these functions could be resolved by "wise
compromise. ' 37 Indeed, while Bonbright made an occasional com-
ment on purists who advocated marginal cost pricing even to the point
30. Sichel & Gies, Introduction, supra note 26, at xiii.
31. Hazlett, supra note 21, at 9.
32. Id. at 10.
33. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 49.
34. Id. at 63 (emphasis omitted).
35. Id. at 120 (emphasis omitted).
36. Id. at 63.
37. Id. In rate design, Bonbright saw economic criteria as more important than fairness,
although he hastened to caution that keeping fairness issues "in their place" did not mean "that
they should be cavalierly dismissed or even belittled." Id. at 123. Bonbright remained commit-
ted to a vision of utility regulation firmly rooted in cost rather than necessity because of "a
conviction that those services now called public utility services belong in that great class of eco-
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of subsidizing public utilities,38 his main comparison throughout his
text was with nationalized or socialized utilities.39
While the analysis of public utility economics and regulation gen-
erally reflected this "stability," there were important intellectual mile-
stones in analysis of regulation during this period. George Stigler and
Claire Friedland's 1962 article arguing that utility regulation had no
effect on electricity prices,40 Harold Demsetz' 1968 article arguing that
natural monopoly was insufficient to justify regulation,41 George Stig-
ler's 1971 economic theory of regulation, 42 and Richard Posner's 1974
survey of regulatory theory43 all raised fundamental questions about
utility regulation separate from second-best issues. These questions
ultimately contributed to later deregulation efforts. Much of this
work reached back to the earlier tradition of a Schumpeterian view of
"competition for the field."'44 These articles and others from the same
period also subjected utility economics to sustained analysis by. non-
specialists for the first time.
Moreover, in the late 1960s and 1970s, utility regulation became
more controversial and policy debates became livelier as a result of a
number of factors, including energy price fluctuations and growing
non-price regulatory burdens on utilities, such as environmental and
nuclear regulations. Regulators awoke from the comparative calm of
the 1945-70 period determined to show that, in the words of one state
regulator, "regulation in the public interest involves being more than a
passive, silent partner to the utilities, acquiescing in company deci-
sions after the fact."'45 A new breed of intervenors began to appear in
rate making proceedings, arguing that construction and pricing deci-
sions should attempt to force companies to internalize environment
nomic products including both commodities and services, than can be best offered for sale in-
stead of being supplied without charge." Id. at 119.
38. See id. at 65.
39. See id. at 67-68 (comparing Canadian, British, and U.S. publicly owned utilities' princi-
ples of ratemaking with investor-owned utilities).
40. See George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of
Electricity, 5 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1962).
41. See Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968).
42. George J. Stigler, The theory of economic regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGmor. Sc. 3
(1971).
43. Richard A. Posner, Theories of economic regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 335
(1974).
44. The phrase was coined by nineteenth century economist Edwin Chadwick, and is
quoted in Hazlett, supra note 21, at 7.
45. William G. Rosenberg, Federal Financing of Electric Utilities in the Wake of Con Ed, in
PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION: CHANGE AND SCOPE, supra note 11, at 62.
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costs. 46 As a result, the 1970s became a decade "of strain, change, and
experimentation for the entire public-utility sector. '47 Regulators un-
derwent a "painful adaptation" to a more adversarial and technically
demanding environment. 48 Utility stocks' declining performance rela-
tive to other industrial stocks in the late 1970s and early 1980s-a gap
in performance Alfred Kahn called "disturbingly large" 49-delivered
a devastating market verdict on regulation. As Kahn noted, "[tihere
is no escaping the inference that [deteriorating utility performance]
represents a profound failure of the institution of regulation itself. '"50
Just as he had throughout the 1970s, Kahn advocated forcing utilities
"to offer their subscribers the widest feasible choice of price/quality
options-which means making rates and rate structures as finely cost
differentiated as possible. '51
Stephen Brown and David Sibley's text offers a clear summary of
conventional utility economics into the mid-1980s. 52 Kahn's basic
structure remained, modified by additional partial-equilibrium in-
sights into specific pricing methods. Brown and Sibley summarized
"the main concepts" of their theme of "efficient pricing by the regu-
lated firm for its services" as
" Efficient prices are those which lead to the highest possible level
of welfare, defined as the sum of consumer surplus and producer
surplus.
" Moving from some given set of prices to efficient prices makes it
possible for the "winners" from the price change to compensate
the "losers" and yet still remain better off than before the
change. Thus, potential economic welfare rises for all
individuals.
* If the regulated firm must break even out of its own sales reve-
nues, potential welfare of society is lower than if the regulated
firm were not required to break even.53
46. See Charles F. Phillips, Jr., The Changing Environment, supra note 28, at 26; see also
BARBARA R. BARKOVICH, REGULATORY INTERVENTIONISM IN THE UTILITY INDUSTRY 15-16
(1989) (describing how environmental groups challenged rate increases, construction of new util-
ity facilities, and operation of existing facilities).
47. Charles F. Phillips, Jr., The Changing Environment, supra note 28, at 28.
48. Id. at 34 (again, quoting Howard Perry).
49. Alfred E. Kahn, Utility Regulation Revisited, in CURRENT ISSUES IN PUBLIC UTILITY
REGULATION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 101,104 [hereinafter
Kahn, Utility Regulation Revisited]. From 1953-73, utility stocks and industrial stocks performed
comparably. See id.
50. Id. at 104.
51. Id. at 115.
52. Similar analyses are present in ROGER SHERMAN, THE REGULATION OF MONOPOLY 124
(1989) and BERG & TSCHIRHART, supra note 6.
53. BROWN & SIBLEY, supra note 6, at 26.
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At the same time that regulators were struggling with the dramat-
ically changed environment, regulatory theory was evolving as well.
Not only were the Chicago insights into contestable markets and a
deeper understanding of competition beginning to be integrated into
the analysis, but economists began to rethink the idea of natural mo-
nopoly itself. Thus, for example, Victor Goldberg suggested in 1976
that regulation was necessary to encourage investment and to reap
scale economies, rather than because market forces would inevitably
lead to a monopoly.54 As Thomas Hazlett noted, Goldberg's argu-
ment implies "precisely contrary to what earlier advocates of public
utility regulation advanced as a defense. ' '55 Indeed,
[w]hereas the economic analysis once suggested monopoly franchis-
ing and public regulation as an antidote to overinvestment and
wasteful duplication, it now recommends it as beneficial in guaran-
teeing specific capital investments where laissez-faire would lead to
too little entry. The model may have entirely reversed its rationale,
yet the policy recommendation lives on: political agency is the solu-
tion to the natural monopoly problem. 56
Regulators and analysts began moving toward two related re-
sponses. First, regulation itself began to be recast. In recognition of
the many distortions introduced by cost of service regulation and the
information problems in its implementation, regulators began to
adopt "price-cap" regulation. 57 Under the RPI-X form, price-cap reg-
ulation allowed utilities a rate of increase in their prices based on a
formula (RPI) incorporating factors such as fuel and labor cost in-
creases over a base price.58 Prices were allowed to rise by less than
the full amount (the X) to create incentives for the utility to operate
efficiently. If the utility discovered efficiencies which reduced its costs
further, it was allowed to keep the difference (at least until the next
adjustment of the formula); if it operated less efficiently, its sharehold-
ers paid the penalty. While solving some of the regulatory informa-
tion and incentive problems, price-cap regulation did not solve them
54. See Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation and administered contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON. &
MoMr. Sci. 434 (1976); see also Hazlett, supra note 21, at 20 (discussing Goldberg's writings on
this topic).
55. Hazlett, supra note 21, at 21.
56. Id. at 22.
57. After its adoption by telecommunications regulators in Britain in 1984, price level regu-
lation quickly spread to the United States. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Price Level Regulation Plus
Inflation is Not an Attractive Alternative to Profit Level Regulation, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 665, 665-
66 (1990) (reviewing JORDAN JAY HILLMAN & RONALD BRAEUTIGAM, PRICE LEVEL REGULA-
TION FOR DIVERSIFIED PUBLIC UTILrmES (1989)) [hereinafter Pierce, Price Level Regulation].
58. See JORDAN JAY HILLMAN & RONALD BRAEUTIGAM, PRICE LEVEL REGULATION FOR
DIVERSIFIED PUBLIC UTILITIES (1989) for a description of RPI-X style regulation.
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all-for example, the initial price still had to be calculated, the RPI
formula designed, and a value for X chosen.59
The second response was to take Demsetz' advice seriously and
push as many regulated industries as possible into competitive
forms.60 Electricity, for example, could be supplied by a competitive
generation sector and delivered over a price-cap regulated, monopoly
transmission network. The design of the competitive sector, of course,
raised important questions-would a single buyer purchase electricity
on a spot market and then allocate it to users at average cost or would
"retail wheeling" allow individual users to negotiate different types of
supply contracts directly with generators? Because the design of the
system has, at the least, profound distributional implications, partial
deregulation simply shifts many questions to a different stage in regu-
latory design. Regardless of how the details are ultimately structured,
many "natural monopolies" are on the verge of fundamental restruc-
turings which call into question the entire natural monopoly regula-
tory structure. The electricity industry, for example, is already
beginning a new era under the federal Energy Policy Act of 199261
which some analysts believe has undercut much of the post-New Deal
regulatory structure.62
Looking back over the history of natural monopoly arguments for
regulation, two things stand out. First, the underlying rationale for
59. More completely, successful price level regulation requires
(a) an initial price level somewhere near the economically efficient price; (b) initial
price relationships somewhere near efficient price relationships; (c) a price adjustment
mechanism that provides a tolerably accurate surrogate for uncontrollable changes in
firm costs; (d) a price adjustment mechanism that reflects uncontrollable changes in
demand factors; (e) a price adjustment mechanism that includes a tolerably accurate
surrogate for the firm's ability to enhance its productive efficiency and that divides
expected productivity increases equitably between the firm and consumers; (f) price
ceilings sufficiently aggregated to permit economically efficient price discrimination but
sufficiently disaggregated to protect consumers with the most inelastic demand; and (g)
avoidance of use or threatened use of profit level data for any regulatory purpose.
Pierce, Price Level Regulation, supra note 57, at 668 (citations omitted).
60. The scope of the presumed "natural monopoly" in public utilities has steadily shrunk
over time, in part because technology offers alternatives previously unimaginable. For example,
many homes in the United States have at least three wires entering--cable television, telephone,
and electric service. All three of these systems are capable of offering combined services, albeit
with sometimes expensive investment in converting infrastructure. Combined with wireless te-
lephony, digital satellite systems, and appliances which make use of multiple energy sources,
energy, telecommunications, and video services are all now subject to at least potential competi-
tion even on the local loop. At the least, however, the transition to a free market in all these
areas is likely to take time if only because those interests which benefit from the current system
of regulation can be expected to resist deregulation. At a minimum, for a potentially lengthy
transition period regulators will continue to intervene in utility operation.
61. Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
62. See, e.g., When Sparks Fly, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 20, 1993, at 68, 69 (citing Glenn Wat-
tley of the consulting firm Arthur D. Little).
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regulating natural monopolies underwent a 180-degree change in di-
rection with little or no impact on the policies regulators attempted to
implement. Second, the technical hubris of regulators in asserting
their ability to translate the concept of an ideal regulated "natural mo-
nopoly" into actual regulation seems only to have grown, despite the
ever-increasing catalog of problems with regulatory implementation.
B. The Technical Solutions
As noted earlier, the solution to the "problem" of public utilities
is conceptually simple: allow the utility to operate as. a monopoly, and
use regulatory means to fix the prices the utility can charge (prevent-
ing it from charging monopoly prices), set quality standards (prevent-
ing it from reducing quality), and require service to all who demand it
(preventing reduction in quantity). Judge Richard Cudahy of the Sev-
enth Circuit described rate regulation as
a relatively simple and self-evidently fair business before the econo-
mists got their hands on it and for some unknown reason tried to
make it efficient .... The old type rate regulation was based on
wonderfully reassuring fictions, such as the idea that you could allo-
cate rate base to classes of customers.63
However, the economists did get their hands on it and as a 1980s text
on regulation warned students, "[a]lthough the [rate of return]
formula itself is rather simple, the calculations, estimations, and deci-
sions involved in obtaining its components are complex, and the crite-
ria guiding determination of each component have a long and rich
history."64
Regulators have adopted two main methods of simultaneously re-
straining the bad aspects of monopoly structure and exploiting its ben-
efits. The first method, rate of return regulation, dominated utility
ratemaking until recently. The second, price-cap regulation, has be-
come increasingly popular with regulators in recent years and is often
combined with restructuring industries to allow partial deregulation.
Even as alternatives to rate of return regulation become more com-
mon, however, rate of return regulation continues to play an impor-
tant role and so I will focus on it rather than price cap regulation.65
63. AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON COMPETITION AND
REGULATION-COMPATIBLE BEDFELLOWS? 8 (Abigail Porter & Penelope S. Ferreira eds.,
1992).
64. HOWE & RASMUSSEN, supra note 10, at 65.
65. See, e.g., HOWARD E. THOMPSON, REGULATORY FINANCE: FINANCIAL FOUNDATION OF
RATE OF RETURN REGULATION xi (1991) ("rate of return [regulation] is not dead. It will play a
key role in whatever the new structure of the regulated sector.").
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In rate of return regulation, utility price regulation begins with a
deceptively simple formula:
RR = O+ T+ (V- D)R
where RR is the firm's total allowed revenue, 0 is the firm's operating
expenses, T is the annual taxes, R is the rate of return the firm is
allowed on its rate base, V is the value of the utility's plant, and D is
the depreciation allowable return.66 Once RR is calculated, the utility
is then allowed to price its product accordingly. In the unrealistic case
of a utility with a single product, price would simply be RR/N, where
N is the total number of units sold. However, all the right hand side
components are problematic.
Inclusion of operating expenses introduces an immediate bias to-
ward overcompensation of factors of production. Labor costs, for ex-
ample, in price-regulated industries are well established to be inflated
because the firms' managers are able to pass all (or at least most) of
the inflated cost on to customers. Since traditional utility price regula-
tion more or less guaranteed a fixed return on capital, there was little
or no incentive to cut costs. Taxes also distort utility pricing in numer-
ous ways. To take but one example, allowing utilities accelerated de-
preciation on investment tax credits can lead to charges to consumers
for taxes larger than the actual taxes paid by the utility.67 Choosing
the rate of return itself is fraught with difficulties. Because regulators
must rely on accounting rates of return rather than economic rates of
return, any connection between the regulatory rate of return and the
appropriate rate of return is purely accidental. 68 Other problems in-
clude the Averch-Johnson bias toward overcapitalization, 69 a reverse
Averch-Johnson bias toward undercapitalization caused by regulatory
lags,70 other costs and biases introduced by regulatory lags,71 "per-
verse incentives" for the regulated firm to expand into other indus-
tries,72 biasing of rate structures to maximize political support for
66. See HowE & RASMUSSEN, supra note 10, at 64.
67. See id. at 86-87.
68. See Franklin M. Fisher & John J. McGowan, On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of
Return to Infer Monopoly Profits, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 82, 83 (1983).
69. See Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Con-
straint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962).
70. See Elizabeth E. Bailey & John C. Malone, Resource allocation and the regulated firm, 1
BELL J. ECON. & Mor~r Sci. 129 (1970).
71. See Ingo Vogelsang, The Design of Regulatory Rules, in REGULATED INDUSTRIES AND
PUBLIC ENTERPRISE, supra note 11, at 11-12, 21-23; see also Ende, supra note 11, at 80 (noting
"the time lag between initiation [of regulating proceedings] and conclusion has become almost
unbelievably long" because of "natural bureaucratic encrustations" and statutory complexity).
72. Roger Sherman & Michael L. Visscher, Rate-of-Return Regulation and Price Structures,
in PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS AND REGULATION 119 (Michael A. Crew ed.,
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regulators, 73 and lack of knowledge concerning critical values neces-
sary to compute first-best outcomes under the framework outlined
above. 74 In sum, rate of return regulation has numerous well-docu-
mented flaws even under a first-best analysis. Many of these have
been known since the beginning of the modern regulatory era.75 Even
more importantly for a second-best analysis, these flaws produce bi-
ases in every conceivable direction. Whether there is a net bias to-
ward overcapitalization or undercapitalization, for example, is
impossible to determine based on theory alone.
The problem of regulation is much deeper, however. For many
years, most attention focused on whether regulation was possible and,
once that was settled, on the rate of return allowed. The structure of
utility pricing was often ignored. 76 When utility regulators began to
pay more attention to rate design in the 1970s, they confronted an
even more daunting informational task.77 By the end of the 1970s "as
1979); see also Walter Adams, Can Regulation Curb Corporate Power?, in PUBLIC UTILITY REG-
ULATION: CHANGE AND SCOPE, supra note 11, at 20 (criticizing holding companies as means to
escape regulatory control).
73. See Stigler & Friedland, supra note 40, at 8.
74. See, e.g., Robert C. Lind, Reassessing the Government's Discount Rate Policy in Light of
New Theory and Data in a World Economy with a High Degree of Capital Mobility, 18 J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. 5-8 (1990); Barbara B. Murray, Irreversibility of Pollution and Depreciation
Policies, in PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION: CHANGE AND SCOPE, supra note 11, at 94 (lack of
knowledge about irreversibility of pollution prevents accurate choice of depreciation rates for
pollution control equipment).
75. See, e.g., CHARLES STILLMAN MORGAN, REGULATION AND THE MANAGEMENT OF PUB-
LIC UnLITIES 118-306 (1923) (providing a thorough non-mathematical account of numerous in-
centive problems in regulated utilities).
76. See Sherman & Visscher, supra note 72, at 119.
77. According to a utility engineer, his company's analytic process in evaluating rate struc-
ture for different sizes of customers requires several steps. See John Mansees, The Structure of
Utility Rates, in PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION: CHANGE AND SCOPE, supra note 11, at 54-58.
First, each class of customer had the costs of metering, billing, and distribution assessed. See id.
at 55. Next "demand costs" (those "associated with plant") were calculated. Id. Finally, "en-
ergy costs," the variable costs of providing energy were calculated. Id. Even after costs were
properly allocated across these three categories, regulators needed to know more "to tell how
much to charge the various sized customers." Id. at 56. An extensive testing program was
needed "to determine customer characteristics to allow us to relate the demand portion of the
costs to the customer characteristics." Id. Regulators needed to know "coincidence factors, di-
versity factors, local factors, demands, and their consumption." Id.; see also Don Charles Uthus
& Diane McIntyre, Public Utility Rate Regulation and the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, 26
DRAKE L. REV. 483, 494-95 (1977) (describing typical state proceeding, which required analysis
involving extensive procedures, producing thousand of pages of record and multiple administra-
tive and judicial proceedings). Indeed, the engineer's account tells us quite a bit about regula-
tory capability-he related the details to defend utility pricing from the charge that it was
"promotional," and produced excess demand. Mansees, supra note 77, at 53-54, 57. The engi-
neer argued that rates which appeared "promotional" might actually be efficient two-part pricing
rules. Further, he noted that the rate making for the "very large residential customer group"
was complicated by the diversity of customers, a diversity partially attributable to a legal require-
ment that religious customers (churches and affiliated organizations) be included in that class of
customer (presumably to provide them with lower rates). Id. at 56-57; see also BROWN & SIBLEY,
1998)
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
much as one-half or more of a typical rate case" concerned rate design
issues. 78 The capacity of regulatory bodies to perform this analysis
sufficiently well to satisfy a first-best policy is questionable; their ca-
pacity to perform it well enough to handle the more complex second-
best analysis is even more so.
Suppose that a regulator has solved the problems described
above and successfully determined the information needed to accu-
rately determine the needed revenue. The regulator now must formu-
late pricing for a utility's products and so must confront the problem
of defining the product.7 9 Even under our optimistic assumption that
the regulator knows and is able to implement a rate design which will
achieve the "correct" total revenue, it must allocate that revenue
across the different products the utility provides. Economists' steady
chorus of "marginal cost pricing," in recent years largely following Al-
fred Kahn's lead,80 has been influential in pulling regulators toward
that policy. In a world without other distortions, marginal cost pricing
makes sound theoretical economic sense. 81 In a world filled with im-
supra note 6, at 60 (comparing informational demands of Ramsey pricing and fully distributed
cost ("FDC") pricing).
78. Charles F. Phillips, Jr., The Changing Environment, supra note 28, at 33.
79. Electricity is a good illustration of the difficulties a regulator faces in defining a regu-
lated utility's product. Although we are accustomed to think of electricity as a standard product,
uniformly available from any outlet, it is capable of being defined as significantly different prod-
ucts. For example, delivery of electricity whose voltage varies X% can be a different product
from delivery of electricity whose voltage varies (X+1O)% if the user has equipment which re-
quires constant voltage. Electricity delivered at noon is different from electricity delivered at
midnight, because it produces significantly different demands on generators' equipment. Elec-
tricity which must be delivered differs from electricity whose delivery can be interrupted at the
will of the generator.
80. See THOMAS K. McCRAw, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 230-59 (1984) for a detailed dis-
cussion of Kahn's influence in promoting marginal cost pricing in regulation. In some respects
Kahn was advocating ideas advanced earlier by Bonbright and others. See Uhler, supra note 25,
at 80; see also BONBRIGHrr, supra 'note 6, at 46 n.5 (attributing marginal cost pricing to A.C.
Pioou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920)). Coase also provides an intellectual history of
marginal cost pricing. Ronald Coase, The theory of public utility pricing and its application, 1
BELL J. ECON. & MOm-r. Sci. 113, 114-123 (1970). I have not discussed Coase's contributions to
the marginal cost pricing debate because it is not directly relevant.
See also Jackalyne Pfannenstiel, Implementing Marginal Cost Pricing in the Electric Utility
Industry, in APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES IN PUBLIC UTILITY INDUSTRIES 53 (Wer-
ner Sichel & Thomas G. Gies eds., 1981) (describing difficulties encountered in implementation
of marginal cost pricing). Pfannenstiel's survey of numerous technical problems in implementing
marginal cost pricing begins with the problem of choosing short run or long run marginal costs
and covers a wide range of practical and theoretical problems. Her conclusion is typical, how-
ever: marginal cost pricing has "several aspects ... for which further theoretical and practical
research is indicated; none, however, is sufficiently critical to further delay implementation." Id.
at 71.
81. See, e.g., BROWN & SIBLEY, supra note 6, at 29 ("Because producer surplus plus con-
sumer surplus rises as price moves toward marginal cost from either direction total surplus is
maximized when price is set equal to marginal cost"). Even in such a world, however, there are
questions about its viability-as a policy option because its implementation assumes a high degree
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perfections, however, marginal cost pricing is not an obvious policy
choice, and certainly cannot be defended on efficiency grounds.
While the 1960s and 1970s saw the parallel development of the
theoretical literature describing problems with utility regulation and
the marginal cost pricing literature, the utility economics literature
paid closest attention to two problems in implementing the desired
solution. First, marginal cost pricing may not be possible if the utility
is required to operate at a point where marginal costs are less than
average costs, because it would lead to a deficit.82 Based on a 1927
paper by Frank Ramsey, economists devised a solution: vary the price
according to the price elasticities of the utility's market. 83 By raising
price above marginal cost more when demand is more price-inelastic,
revenue can be increased while affecting the volume of sales as little
as possible. 84 "Ramsey pricing" thus eliminated the deficit through a
premium above marginal cost which varied inversely with the elastic-
ity of demand.8 5 While Ramsey pricing is not always feasible itself,86
it "solved" the technical problems with marginal cost pricing.
of knowledge on the part of regulators. Regulatory rules must also be feasible. Feasibility re-
quires that the regulatory scheme be both individually rational and incentive compatible. See
LAFFONT & TIROLE, supra note 3, at 34-35. Not only must these technical criteria be satisfied
but the regulations must be politically feasible as well-ruling out otherwise preferred mecha-
nisms, such as subsidies, in some cases.
Technically the solution is simple: The markup of price over marginal cost is given by
Markup = P, ,
P, E
where Pi is the price in market i, Ci is the marginal cost, A is a constant which adjusts prices in all
markets to ensure that the firm breaks even, and ei is the price elasticity of demand. See BROWN
& SIBLEY, supra note 6, at 40. In practice, however, calculating such prices is quite demanding.
Not only can ["t]he numerical solution of Ramsey prices ... become quite complicated" but the
information needed for calculating Ramsey prices for a utility producing a widely used commod-
ity like electricity would be extensive. Just determining the price elasticity of demand for each
market, figures which are unlikely to be constant even in the medium run, would tax the re-
sources of most regulatory commissions. Calculation of Ramsey prices would also require know-
ing cross-price elasticities for each pair of goods as well. See id. at 41-43.
82. See id. at 35.
83. See William J. Baumol & David F. Bradford, Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost
Pricing, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 265 (1970); F.P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation,
37 ECON. J. 47 (1927). As in Brown and Sibley's book, Ramsey pricing is sometimes confusingly
referred to as "second-best" pricing. See, e.g., BROWN & SIBLEY, supra note 6, at 39-40. "Sec-
ond-best" pricing refers not to the problem discussed by Lipsey and Lancaster but to the intro-
duction of the break-even constraint.
84. See BROWN & SIBLEY, supra note 6, at 40 (following Ramsey prices alters "market as
little as possible from the price-equal-marginal cost.").
85. See LAFFO, r & TIROLE, supra note 3, at 30-31. A variation on this was Allais' proposal
that the premium be fixed across all goods, alleviating some of the informational problems but
reducing the theoretical efficiency of the prices. See id. at 30.
86. For example, Ramsey pricing may not be sustainable where a natural monopoly pro-
duces services which are sold to both consumers and other producers. See John C. Panzar, Sus-
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The second major problem in utility pricing addressed by the the-
oretical literature is the allocation of common costs among different
classes of users-something which "is not a straightforward task and is
the source of many of the most muddled, lengthy and unsatisfactory
proceedings in regulatory history. ' 87 The most common approach in
the United States is fully distributed cost ("FDC") allocation in which
"common costs are allocated to service based on their relative shares
of quantities such as output, peak demand, revenue or attributable
cost."'8 8 Under this approach a service (e.g., residential electrical ser-
vice) must generate sufficient revenue to cover both the attributable
costs of the service (e.g., wiring to houses) and a fraction of the com-
mon costs (e.g., base generating capacity), a reaction usually calcu-
lated "without any thought of economic efficiency." 8 9 Sometimes
demand elasticities are used to calculate the fraction as well.90 Not
surprisingly, given FDC methods' lack of a theoretical pedigree, econ-
omists' "criticisms of FDC have been scathing." 91 Not only are FDC
allocation methods "essentially arbitrary" but they are unrelated to
marginal costs and are "utterly meaningless" for analyzing cross-sub-
sidy issues.92 When firms have high ratios of common costs to attribu-
table costs, there is "a large degree of indeterminacy in setting
prices."'93 FDC prices have the important practical advantage of being
capable of calculation from a regulated monopolist's books,
however.94
As with the budget constraint problem "solved" by Ramsey pric-
ing, the solution here is both informationally demanding and subject
to second-best problems. Brown and Sibley's approach is typical-a
theory of non-uniform price structures developed out of partial equi-
librium results and without considering second-best theory. For ex-
ample, their derivation of the concept of Pareto dominating, incentive
tainability, Efficiency, and Vertical Integration, in REGULATED INDUSTRIES AND PUBLIC
ENTERPRISE, supra note 11, at 171, 172.
87. BROWN & SIBLEY, supra note 6, at 44.
88. Id. at 44-45.
89. Id. at 45. It also involves "numerous conventions regarding depreciation rates, valua-
tion of assets at book vs. replacement cost, construction work in progress and hundreds of other
items." Id. at 45-46.
90. See id. at 46.
91. Id. at 49. Kahn pithily describes the futility of the effort to allocate common costs as
"not a question of looking for a black cat in a room in which all the lights have been turned out.
There is no cat there." Alfred E. Kahn, The Uneasy Marriage Between Regulation and Competi-
tion, TELEMATICS, Sept. 1984, at 1, 12.
92. BROWN & SIBLEY, supra note 6, at 49.
93. Id. at 51.
94. See id. at 60.
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comparable, non-uniform rate structures is dependent on consumers'
self-selection of the corporate tariff when offered a choice.95 Thus if
two types of consumers (high and low usage) are given a choice be-
tween a uniform price P, based on average cost, and a two-part tariff
which is a combination of an entry fee (E) and a variable charge based
on usage (P*) where E= QH( P)( P-P*),96 P*< P, and P*'>MC. Con-
sumers of the high usage type will opt for the multipart tariff, and
consumers of the low usage type will opt to continue to pay P. Be-
cause the two part tariff is incentive compatible, only the high usage
type consumers will choose it. Brown and Sibley demonstrate that the
firm and high usage type consumers are better off and there is no wel-
fare change for the low usage type consumers; as a result the tariff is
Pareto improving.
Aside from assuming that consumers' demand curves are known
to the utility,97 this discussion neglects the second-best problem. In an
imperfect world there is no reason to believe that improving the "effi-
ciency" of the utility's pricing will lead to improved social efficiency.
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the customer types sorted
by demand, as the structure analyzed by Brown and Sibley requires to
be incentive compatible, will be the same as the customer types sorted
by second-best considerations. For example, two firms which
purchase electricity from a utility may have similar demand curves but
one may be part of a competitive industry while the other may be a
monopoly. The key result of incentive compatibility is thus uncon-
nected to the prices which are efficient after considering second-best
considerations.
When conventional utility economics considers issues relevant to
second-best analysis, it does so using assumptions which both reduce
the problem to one solvable with conventional economic tools and
make the results unrealistic. For example, Brown and Sibley, in a
chapter they label as "written for the technical reader," address some
of the issues involved in a second-best analysis by considering the im-
pact of changes in prices to business consumers and downstream users
through cross-elasticity efforts in final product markets.98 Their analy-
sis rests on what Brown and Sibley characterize as "very strong as-
sumptions about downstream cost and supply structure" which "are
met in perfectly competitive markets and, under still further assump-
95. Id. at 65-67.
96. This entry fee ensures that the firm continues to break even.
97. See BROWN & SIBLEY, supra note 6, at 68.
98. Id. at 130-131.
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tions, by markets which are contestable." 99 Their goal is to "not dras-
tically increase the amount of information" required of policy-makers
because
[i]f efficient pricing principles require an accounting of the flow-
through effects from the markets of the regulated firm into myriad
other markets, then the analyst is little better off than if he ignored
them; the required data and computational complexity would be
overwhelming. Thus, any modifications to the pricing rules we have
discussed in previous chapters should be simple ones.100
Requiring a second-best solution to produce only "simple" changes in
the first-best solution may be required by political feasibility or by the
lack of technical capability in a regulatory agency. Such a require-
ment eliminates achieving a socially efficient outcome as a policy goal
and requires justification of the first-best policy prescription on non-
efficiency grounds.
Economists dominated much of the public utility regulatory de-
bate. As in so many areas, economics as a discipline successfully cap-
tured a public policy debate through the strength of the analytical
tools, the power of the economic model of human behavior, and the
attractiveness of the chance to divide up enormous efficiency gains
from regulation. In practice, however, the technical solutions created
by economists proved less satisfying. Not only are there seemingly
endless problems identified by the partial equilibrium analysis, there
are the inconvenient and consistent suggestions by the Chicago school
that if one were really concerned with efficiency, deregulation is much
more likely to be the appropriate policy.
The problem with economic analysis here is that it promises so
much more than it delivers. Anyone viewing the utility industry today
would be hard pressed to find widespread evidence of even technolog-
ical efficiency; social efficiency seems an even more distant goal. If
economic regulation of natural monopolies is not about efficiency,
however, there is a strong possibility that the Chicago school has a
better explanation of regulators' motives. At a minimum, the failure
to take second-best theory into account suggests that even in the rela-
tively easy case of a natural monopoly, the efficiency justification for
economic regulation is at best an unfulfilled aspiration.
99. Id. at 132.
100. Id. at 132.
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C. The Legal Environment
Utility (or other) regulators confront two types of legal con-
straints. First, a state or federal constitution may limit regulators' abil-
ity to set rates. The federal takings clauses, for example, prevent
uncompensated confiscation of a privately owned utility's property
either directly or by requiring it to provide service for free. Depend-
ing on how vigorously the courts are willing to enforce the takings
clauses, this constraint operates well short of requiring free service
and thus could be a significant limit.10' Second, the statutes creating
regulatory schemes may require or forbid particular actions.'0 2 These
are essentially political constraints, since the language of a statute is
subject to alteration by the legislature if the courts' interpretation is
not to the legislature's (or special interests able to control the legisla-
ture's) liking.10 3 Moreover, there are significant issues concerning the
courts' institutional competence to play a role in monitoring
agencies.'0 4
Legal constraints serve two important functions: they set the
terms of the "regulatory bargain"'1 5 between the State and the regu-
lated entity, and they create the mechanisms through which the tech-
nical expertise of the regulatory body is applied to the regulated
entity. While both are important, solving both problems simultane-
ously is difficult. Constraining regulators from engaging in opportu-
nistic behavior on the margin requires limiting precisely the discretion
necessary to effectively regulate in the manner first-best analysis sug-
gests.' 0 6 For example, allowing detailed regulatory actions such as
101. The Constitution may also play a role in allocating power among regulators. The
Supreme Court's opinion in Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953 (1986), for
example, relied on the Supremacy Clause to allow Congress to shift power from state regulators
to federal regulators. While which regulator is administering the regulatory scheme is undoubt-
edly significant in many respects, particularly where federal and state regulators are pursuing
radically different regulatory strategies, it is not relevant here. Professor Richard J. Pierce, Jr.
has suggested that much of modem federal administrative law is a result of the Supreme Court's
distrust of the lower federal courts, preventing the judiciary from playing a more important role
in keeping regulatory agencies politically accountable. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the
Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239 (1989).
102. For an example, see the Pennsylvania statute described infra note 120 and accompany-
ing text.
103. See BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 149. Post-Hope court decisions "are for the most part
interpretive of statue law rather than of constitutional mandate [and] are subject to change by
statutory amendment." Id. Hence, they are given "only incidental attention" in his analysis. Id.
104. For reasons of space I will not discuss these issues in this article.
105. The "bargain" is the implicit agreement of the regulated to invest in and operate the
necessary plant in exchange for a "fair" return.
106. Constraining extreme forms of opportunism, such as uncompensated nationalization, is
not difficult, of course.
19981
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
specifying allowable supply contracts or application of a "used and
useful" standard may be necessary to implement an efficient solution
to the regulator's optimization problem. A regulator could act oppor-
tunistically in requiring a utility to use more expensive, locally pro-
duced inputs or by later disallowing expenditures the regulator had
deemed prudent ex ante on the ground the investments did not pro-
duce useful results ex post.
1. Constitutional constraints
Constitutional constraints offer a means of limiting the ability of
political actors to alter the terms of the regulatory bargain. It is par-
ticularly important that the "rules of the game" be binding on the en-
tity which holds regulatory power for several reasons. First, without
binding rules, regulators have broad scope for opportunistic behavior,
introducing regulatory uncertainty.10 7 Second, binding regulators
reduces the scope for discretionary regulatory activity and thus the
size of the rents available. This in turn reduces the incentive to use
"bribes, litigation, propaganda, and future career opportunities" to in-
fluence regulators.' 08 The ability to make a binding commitment not
to deviate from rules also allows policies which depend on the regu-
lated entity believing policy will not change. 0 9 Enforcement of regu-
latory rules through general enforcement mechanisms also limits the
complexity possible-"regulatory rules have to be simple and based
on readily interpretable data""10 -to allow legislatures and courts to
assess regulators' and regulated entities' compliance.
The courts' treatment of the legal issues in the regulation of pub-
lic utilities has changed substantially over time. Constitutional con-
straints on substantive regulatory law begin with the 1898 Supreme
Court opinion in Smyth v. Ames"' which held that the Constitution
required that
the basis of all calculations as to the reasonableness of rates to be
charged by a [regulated firm] must be the fair value of the property
used by [the regulated firm] for the convenience of the public....
And in order to ascertain that value, the original cost of construc-
107. See Vogelsang, supra note 71, at 14.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 15.
110. See id. at 16.
111. 169 U.S. 466 (1898). The Court had previously legitimized legislative authority over
private entities' prices in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 126 (1877), a case which did not involve any
natural monopoly claims. Smyth was the first "complete statement" of the constitutional re-
quirements for rate making. See E.M. BERNSTEIN, PUBLIC UTILITY RATE MAKING AND THE
PRICE LEVEL 8 (1937).
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tion, the amount expended in permanent improvements, the
amount and market value of its bonds and stock, the present as
compared with the original cost of construction, the probable earn-
ing capacity of the property under particular rates prescribed by
statute, and the sum required to meet operating expenses, are all
matters for consideration, and are to be given such weight as may be
just and right in each case.112
Smyth proved an unworkable framework for analysis. The four
criteria set out in the opinion were not assigned weights by the opin-
ion, making the ultimate balancing by regulators arbitrary. In addi-
tion, criteria like the market value of a regulated company's stock and
bonds were dependent on regulatory action themselves. 113 As one an-
alyst concluded after a survey of the law under Smyth, "[t]he regula-
tion of privately owned U.S. public utilities has had great difficulty
escaping circular reasoning, which in one way or another causes regu-
latory policy to be determined by regulatory policy. 11 4 Even criteria
as seemingly simple as original cost proved extremely difficult to im-
plement in practice because of the primitive accounting tools available
and the potential for regulated entities to attempt to inflate costs. Re-
placement cost raised even more difficult questions in cases where
technology changed-current construction would reflect both changes
in the technology of the regulated industry and changes in construc-
tion technology, making cost comparisons difficult if not impossible.
By the 1930s, the Smyth framework had produced a complex, contra-
dictory morass, which expressed itself in massive and largely unsuc-
cessful efforts to distill it into principles.115
Whether in recognition of the unworkability of the Smyth frame-
work, because of personnel and philosophical changes, or simply to
112. Id. at 546-47.
113. Stock in a regulated company which was allowed supra-market returns on its invest-
ments, for example, would be worth substantially more than stock in a regulated company which
was subject to restrictions on pricing that kept returns below market rates.
114. Roger Sherman, Is Public-Utility Regulation Beyond Hope?, in CURRENT ISSUES IN
PUBLIC UTILITY ECoNOMICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 66;
see also BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 148-49 (criticizing Smyth's fair-value rule).
115. See, e.g., GLAESER, supra note 6; ROBERT H. WHrITEN, VALUATION OF PUBLIC SER-
VICE CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) (two-volume, 2,000-page treatise); see also ELECTRICAL UTIL-
ITIES: THE CRISIS IN PUBLIC CONTROL 52 (William E. Mosher ed., 1929) ("About the only
positive statement that can be made concerning the court's power to review the work of commis-
sions is that the extent of that power is uncertain."); HENRY FLOY, VALUE FOR RATEMAKING V
(1916) (300-plus page treatise by an engineer critical of "various and conflicting views as to the
principles involved in determining the basis of value for ratemaking"); TAYLOR E. GRONINGER,
PUBLIC UTILITY RATE-MAKING 201 (1928) ("Smith [sic] v. Ames is fraught with grief."); id. at
202 (noting Illinois rate case with twenty-four hearings over sixty-two days, 10,000 pages of testi-
mony, 283 exhibits, pending for more than two years in 1914-1916); WILLIAM G. RAYMOND, THE
PUBLIC AND ITS UTILITIES 275 (1925) ("There is no rule by which fair return may be
computed.").
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avoid the endless stream of rate cases which the New Deal's federal
regulatory laws would otherwise soon provide, the Supreme Court re-
treated from the Smyth v. Ames framework in Federal Power Commis-
sion v. Hope Natural Gas Co. 116 In Hope the Court held that
[u]nder the statutory standard of "just and reasonable" it is the re-
sult reached not the method employed which is controlling.... It is
not theory but the impact of the rate order which counts. If the
total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unrea-
sonable, judicial inquiry under the Act is at an end. The fact that
the method employed to reach that result may contain infirmities is
not then important. Moreover, the Commission's order does not
become suspect by reason of the fact that it is challenged. It is the
product of expert judgment which carries a presumption of validity.
And he who would upset the rate order under the Act carries the
heavy burden of making a convincing showing that it is invalid be-
cause it is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences." 7
Not only did Hope signal a retreat from constitutional review of
ratemaking, it changed the focus of judicial review from analysis of
the methods used to the looser constraint of an overall reasonable
result. The Supreme Court virtually abandoned the field of ratemak-
ing after Hope; between 1944 and the late 1980s it decided no cases on
the constitutional validity of state ratemaking and deferred broadly to
federal regulators in the few federal ratemaking cases it decided.118
The Supreme Court finally returned to the constitutional
ratemaking issues in 1989 in Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch.119
Barasch dealt with the dominant issue of electric utility regulation of
the 1980s-how to treat investments in plants (mostly nuclear) which
ex post could be seen to be mistakes.' 20 The Court rejected challenges
116. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
117. Id. at 602. The magnitude of the retreat from Smyth can be seen in Justice Jackson's
opinion concurring in the result. Jackson argued that the Court upheld the rate making "as rea-
sonable, but what makes it so or what could possibly make it otherwise, I cannot learn." 320
U.S. at 645-46 (Jackson, J. concurring).
118. See PIERCE, supra note 6, at 62.
119. 488 U.S. 299 (1989).
120. The Duquesne Light Company joined a multi-utility project in 1967 to construct seven
nuclear power plants. See id. at 302. In 1980 the project canceled planned construction on four
of the seven plants, after having paid more than $34 million in preliminary construction costs.
See id. A Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission investigation into the project, made in con-
nection with a request by Duquesne to recover these costs from ratepayers, found "that the
[consortium] decisions in regard to the [canceled plants] at every stage [leading] to their cancel-
lation, were reasonable and prudent . I..." d  at 303. After Duquesne was granted a rate
increase based upon this report, however, the state consumer advocate's office successfully
sought its revocation based upon a newly enacted state law forbidding consideration of the cost
of construction until the facility in question became "used and useful in service to the public."
Id. at 303.
In challenging the revocation, the utility argued that the "used and useful" requirement,
typically imposed in a fair value approach to ratemaking, was inconsistent with Pennsylvania's
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to regulators' disallowance of substantial costs in language reminis-
cent of second-best theory, holding that
[t]he economic judgments required in rate proceedings are often
hopelessly complex and do not admit of a single correct result. The
Constitution is not designed to arbitrate these economic niceties.
Errors to the detriment of one party may well be canceled out by
countervailing errors or allowances in another part of the rate pro-
ceeding. The Constitution protects the utility from the net effect of
the rate order on its property. Inconsistencies in one aspect of the
methodology have no constitutional effect on the utility's property
if they are compensated by countervailing factors in some other
aspect. 121
Barasch reaffirmed the Hope end result test and firmly established
that the federal Constitution imposes few significant limitations on
state regulators' ratemaking powers beyond barring outright confisca-
tion without compensation. 122 The experience in the Smyth era dem-
onstrates the difficulty in applying constitutional constraints to
complex regulatory questions. Constraining regulators is therefore
likely to require reliance on statutory methods rather than constitu-
tional ones until the courts are willing to do the hard work of crafting
a constitutional interpretation which provides intelligible guidance.123
2. Statutory constraints
Regulation of natural monopolies in this century in the United
States has typically been accomplished through regulatory agencies, to
which legislative bodies have delegated both the authority to regulate
and significant discretion in deciding how to regulate. 24 Prior to the
historical cost based ratemaking. See id. at 313. The utility also argued that the "used and use-
ful" requirement impermissibly constrained the regulators from properly balancing consumer
and investor interests. See id. at 314.
121. Id.
122. Ironically, one area in which courts have recently had significant impacts on regulators
is impeding federal energy deregulation efforts. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended
Effects of Judicial Review of Agency Rules: How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Electric-
ity Crisis of the 1990s, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 7 (1991) [hereinafter Pierce, Unintended Effects].
123. Although both Barasch and Hope asserted that there was some point at which regula-
tors' actions might become confiscation of property, the Supreme Court's refusal to entertain
challenges to disallowances of multi-billion dollar nuclear plant investment throughout the 1980s
suggests that point would be difficult to reach.
124. See Priest, supra note 6, at 296 (regulatory commissions "inaugurated with sudden uni-
formity in the decade and a half following 1907.") Other legal constraints attempt to create
regulatory repeat players to represent interests who would normally be excluded from the pro-
cess (public advocates, for example), use separation of functions to reduce staff influence, and
require action within specified time limits to prevent regulatory lag. See Leigh H. Hammond,
Regulation in the Southeast. Comments, in CURRENT ISSUES IN PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 86-88 (describing reform process in
North Carolina); see also John R. Marks III, Regulation in the Southeast: Comments, in CURRENT
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establishment of administrative bodies, utility regulation was largely
conducted by municipal governments through franchise
contracting. l2 5
Over time, there appears to have been a systematic transformation
in the utility franchise form. Early franchises incorporated provi-
sions of great generality. Later franchises attempted more detailed
specifications of contractual requirements. Toward the end of the
nineteenth century, however, franchises for many different public
services-electricity, gas, water-began to incorporate provisions
providing for the subsequent adjustment of terms by independent
groups of arbitrators, committees, or boards, charged to provide for
amendments fair to both city and utility.126
By the 1920s, however, regulation by commission was firmly estab-
lished as the dominant form in the United States. Among the argu-
ments proponents made for replacing municipal regulation (either by
local commission or by franchise contract) were: (1) to take advan-
tage of the greater data collection capabilities of state commissions; 127
(2) "to protect interurban and intercounty services" from injury by
another locality's regulator; 128 (3) to adequately protect investors
from fraud;129 and (4) to have adequate legislative power to
regulate. 130
State commissions proved inadequate as interstate connections
between utilities grew.' 3 ' A 1926 Syracuse University research project
studying the problem concluded that the "only feasible solution" was
["n]ational control of wholesale interstate shipments. '132 While fed-
eral regulators eventually began to play a significant role in some as-
pects of utility regulation, the primary responsibility for ratemaking
remained at the state level. A typical state utility statute, for example,
authorizes regulators to weigh a list of factors in setting regulatory
ISSUES IN PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, supra note
6, at 93-96 (describing reform process in Florida).
125. See Priest, supra note 6, at 320-21.
126. Id. at 321.
127. See Clyde Lyndon King, State Versus Municipal Utility Commissions, in THE REGULA-
TION OF MUNICIPAL UTILITIES, supra note 21, at 253, 256-58.
128. Id. at 258-59.
129. See id. at 259-62.
130. See id. at 262-63.
131. By 1926 approximately nine percent of power nationally was transmitted between
states, only four states imported no power, six states exported no power, and three individual
states imported roughly half the power they consumed. See ELECTRICAL UTILITIES, supra note
115, at 130-31, 133. By 1934 almost twenty percent of power generated moved across state lines.
See G. LLOYD WI.SON ET AL., PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 362 (1938).
132. ELECTRICAL UTILITIES, supra note 115, at 147.
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parameters. 133 Although there remain important unanswered ques-
tions about the reasons for and effects of the shift to the commission
form of regulation,134 for our purposes, four features of legislative reg-
ulatory constraints are important.
First, economic regulation of natural monopolies (like many
forms of regulation) is embedded in a complex set of interconnected,
sometimes conflicting regulatory requirements. For example, by the
end of the 1970s it was "not uncommon" for a utility contemplating a
nuclear plant "to confront as many as twenty state and federal agen-
cies for necessary licenses and permits, to say nothing about the possi-
bility of subsequent court action initiated by environmental
groups."'1 35 The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
("PURPA"), 136 for example, "forced each state to consider such issues
as marginal-cost pricing, time-of-day rates, and below-cost lifeline
rates,"'137 provoking resistance from state regulators to federal inva-
sion of their turf. State regulators also resisted PURPA because of "a
fear of upsetting the delicate balance among rates of various customer
classes and within classes ... .138 In addition, a regulatory legal struc-
ture can be seen as a costly legal structure "profitable only if it is used
long enough."'1 39 As the cost of creating regulatory structures is gen-
erally inversely related to their complexity, the regulatory community
(including regulators, the regulated, interest groups, and, perhaps
most importantly, the lawyers and other advocates who practice in the
area) has an important incentive to maintain the basic regulatory
structure, layering on additional complexities, rather than timely
adopting paradigm shifts.
Second, the absence of significant general constitutional con-
straints requiring coherence in regulatory statutes (e.g., the nondele-
gation doctrine) means that regulatory legislation often does not give
regulators clear mandates, but rather leaves them with the discretion
to strike their own balance among competing policy goals. The recent
trend toward increased judicial deference to regulators in interpreting
133. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § § 4909.15, 4909.151, 4909.152, 4909.153, 4909.154,
4909.155, 4909.156, 4909.159 (Anderson 1991 & Supp. 1996) (setting out factors to be
considered).
134. See Priest, supra note 6, at 321-22.
135. Charles F. Phillips, Jr., The Changing Environment, supra note 28, at 32.
136. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 16, 30,
42 and 43 U.S.C.)
137. Uhler, supra note 25, at 81.
138. Id. at 81.
139. Vogelsang, supra note 71, at 15.
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regulatory statutes (e.g., the Chevron doctrine) 140 only enhances this
discretion.
Third, regulatory activities cross jurisdictional boundaries in
many ways. Federal and multiple states' regulatory policies are all in-
volved in determining how many energy utilities operate today, and as
many utilities become multinational firms, foreign regulators are also
becoming important. During the New Deal, Congress expanded into
the field, enacting federal legislation to regulate utilities' interstate ac-
tivities.141 The federal intervention "solved" some of the problems of
state regulators by bringing interstate activities, under regulators' con-
trol but created new problems by adding an additional layer of regula-
tory control. Efficient solution to a multi-state utility's rate
"problem" now required coordination between, for example, federal,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania regulators. As utilities continue to grow into
international companies, this problem increases.
Fourth, even if we assume non-constitutional mechanisms may be
sufficiently powerful to resist capture, we are still left with a largely
negative power. A regulatory commission
cannot penalize management for its incompetence, for its lack of
imagination, or for its lack of creativity because it does not have a
clear view of what potentially attainable cost reductions are. It has
no way, therefore, of stopping the great vice of monopoly, namely,
the monopolist's tendency to lead the quiet life and to squander so-
ciety's treasure in the form of excessive cost. Limiting the monopo-
list to a fair return may be the essence of the regulatory process, but
it does not achieve society's central objective. Put differently, regu-
lation is often a pass-through mechanism for the inefficiency, cost
escalation, and lethargy of pampered management luxuriating in an
ambience of governmental permissiveness. 142
Legislative constraints on regulators thus pose problems whose form
mirrors the problem analyzed by Lipsey and Lancaster. Each regula-
tor must consider not only the first-best regulatory solution (which it-
self may be difficult to accomplish for the reasons described in the
previous section) but also second-best problems. For example, a util-
140. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
141. The Federal Power Act of 1935 regulated interstate wholesale sales and transmission of
electric energy, giving the Federal Power Commission the power to set rates, require utilities to
keep specific forms of accounting information, set depreciation, require annual reports, and
make rates public. See 16 U.S.C. § 791a (1994). The Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935 regulated the corporate form and activity of multi-utility electric and gas utilities to attempt
to prevent what many regulators saw as abuses. See 15 U.S.C. § 79a (1994). The Natural Gas
Act of 1938 regulated interstate transportation and sale of natural gas. See 15 U.S.C. § 717
(1994).
142. Adams, supra note 72, at 16; see also MORGAN, supra note 75, at 88-89 (regulation "puts
a damper on individual initiative" and has a "benumbing, stifling" effect).
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ity regulator in Ohio conducting a ratemaking proceeding for my elec-
tric utility, the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company ("CEI"),
must consider not only the impacts of federal regulatory policy but
also:
* CEI's local competitor, Cleveland Public Power ("CPP"), and
the city of Cleveland's regulatory policy toward both CEI and
CPP;
14 3
* Pennsylvania regulators' actions, because CEI is a unit of a
holding company with utility properties in that state;
* Canadian regulators, because a potential source of power for
CEI is Canadian utilities generally and Ontario Hydro in
particular;
* federal policy toward the Tennessee Valley Authority, another
potential source of power;
* federal policy toward coal use, because environmental restric-
tions on coal generally and policies biased toward eastern coal
in particular will effect energy production;
* natural gas regulators' actions at the state and federal level,
because natural gas is a significant substitute for electricity;
and
* Mexican energy regulators' policies, because Ohio's automo-
bile parts industry has significant plant investment in Mexico,
and energy availability and price can affect job allocation by
multinational firms.
* The regulator will also need to consider the imperfections an-
alyzed by Lipsey and Lancaster-the degree of monopoly
power present in supplier and customer sectors.
Even if legislatures could specify legal constraints that would lead
regulators to accomplish public policy goals which had democratic le-
gitimacy, these problems seem to me to be overwhelming. By the
time a state regulatory agency amassed the data, built the models, and
reached even a moderate degree of understanding about the proper
method of implementing the policies, circumstances would have likely
changed-requiring a fresh round of modeling and data gathering.
Moreover, policies would depend on other political entities' policies in
ways which might be difficult to support politically-if Ohio utility
rates were raised to "offset" a "mistake" by Pennsylvania regulators,
Ohio regulators would face a difficult task to justify their actions.
143. This alone is a complex problem that played a significant role in the city of Cleveland's
default on its bonds in the 1970s.
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D. The Political Environment
Utility regulation is often complex and dull. It is also intensely
political.144 Both majoritarian 145 and minoritarian 146 bias present im-
portant problems for the design of regulatory institutions. Early twen-
tieth century works on utility regulation echo the New York
Merchant's Association broadside quoted earlier and cast utility regu-
lation as a struggle between the people and monopolists. A 1912 Na-
tional Municipal League book on municipal utilities, for example,
opened with a justification of regulation because ["s]ociety cannot af-
ford to allow those who have a monopoly upon the most salient needs
of urban life to exploit the many simply to bring added shekels into
the pockets of the few."'1 47 Individuals required protection against
"discriminatory rates"'148 and utilities stopped from dominating city
governments and subverting municipal institutions. 49 To remedy
these ills required strong institutions; the National Municipal League
called for commissions "with full and complete powers" that would
"militantly" thwart ["a]ny attempt to diffuse regulative power and re-
sponsibility under the time-worn guise of checks and balances.' 5 0
144. This has been recognized from the earliest analyses of utility regulation. See, e.g., MOR.
oAN supra note 75, at 81 ("Regulation by its very nature is an attempt to reconcile two divergent
interests through public, that is, political, action."); see also WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, JR., THE
PoLrIcS OF PUBLIC UTILrrY REGULATION (1983); John B. Legler, Regulation in the Southwest:
Introduction, in CURRENT ISSUES IN PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JAMES
C. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 85 ("From the perspective of the consumer probably no state
agency, not even the state legislature, affects their pocketbook as much as their state public-
service commission.").
Another example is the current dispute in Ohio over who will hear consumer complaints
about utilities. Ohio regulates public utilities through the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
("PUCO"). It also has a consumer agency, the Office of Consumers' Counsel ("OCC"), which
advocates residential consumer interests in utility proceedings. These two agencies are currently
(in spring 1997) engaged in a "nasty spat" over which agency has jurisdiction to handle consumer
complaints about telephone service. See Zach Schiller, Utility Agencies Fighting Over Turf THE
PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 16, 1997, at 1H. The PUCO has subpoena power and power over utilities,
but sees its complaint role as being a mediator or arbiter between consumers and utilities.
PUCO also claims that it needs the information it receives from complaints to assist it in its
regulatory duties. The OCC lacks the enforcement tools of the PUCO but has a clearer mission
to take the consumer side in disputes. OCC argues that PUCO has a conflict of interest since it
must also look after the utilities' interests. See id.
145. Majoritarian bias is "the overrepresentation of the many over the few" or "the tyranny
of the majority." KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 57.
146. Minoritarian bias is ["t]he overrepresentation of concentrated interests." Id. at 56.
147. King, The Need for Regulation, supra note 21, at 12.
148. Id. at 12-13. An interesting feature of the history of utility regulation is the shift from
the early preoccupation with preventing "discrimination" in rates to the modem justification of
complex rate structures.
149. See King, The Need for Regulation, supra note 21, at 20-21.
150. King, In Conclusion, in THE REGULATION OF MUNICIPAL UTILITIES, supra note 21, at
379.
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After all, ["t]he highly paid, well-fed corporate expert must be met
with a highly paid, highly equipped civic expert.' 151
After this initial consumerist approach,152 increases in prices fol-
lowing World War I
coupled with the relatively fixed incomes of the utilities, has placed
the emphasis in commissions' activities, not on the reduction of
rates to reduce excessive profits or to eliminate discrimination, but
on the increasing of rates or the procuring in other ways of the reve-
nue needed by the utilities, by subsidies from the public tax rolls, if
necessary, in order that they might keep from floundering and from
thereby depriving the people of good service, or, in fact, of any ser-
vice at all.153
Within a short time of the adoption of commission regulation, state
regulatory bodies had been sufficiently captured that utilities "rallied
to the support of the commissions"'154 while consumer advocates dis-
covered commissions could raise as well as lower prices. Price stabil-
ity returned for a short time in the 1920s, only to be disrupted by the
Depression. 55
Richard Pierce, one of the preeminent scholars of utility ratemak-
ing, concluded that state utility ratemaking exhibited minoritarian bias
during the 1950s and early 1960s and majoritarian bias during the
1970s and 1980s.156 During the 1950s and early 1960s, conditions in
the utility industry were those necessary for minoritarian bias. Rate
regulation produced a significant impact on individual utilities but the
costs of providing utilities with significant rents were spread across
society in general.' 57 Moreover, utility rate regulation is generally a
complex and tedious subject, not well suited to discussion in the me-
dia. 158 Because utility costs were declining, regulators could allow
utilities to enjoy rates of return far above their cost of capital while
individual consumers could experience declining utility charges. 159
"With electricity rates declining, there was no simple symbol that
could be used to organize the majority to do anything to preclude the
151. Id. at 379-80.
152. See generally William M. Wherry, Jr., PUBLIC UTILITIES AND THE LAW 251-256 (1925)
(attacking public utility commissions for setting rates too low).
153. MORGAN, supra note 75, at 77.
154. Id. at 77.
155. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 111, at 6.
156. See Richard J. Pierce, Public Utility Regulatory Takings: Should the Judiciary Attempt to
Police the Political Institutions?, 77 GEO. L.J. 2031, 2047-49 (1989) [hereinafter Pierce, Public
Utility Regulatory Takings].
157. See id. at 2048.
158. See id.
159. See id.
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minority from maximizing their profits through the regulatory pro-
cess." 160 One state utility regulator speculated that "many of the citi-
zens probably did not even know that the commission existed" before
the 1970s.161 Moreover, during this period the endless debates over
appropriate cost formulas were submerged by the combination of fall-
ing costs and increasing sales of electricity.162 While this did not sat-
isfy economists like Bonbright, 163 it satisfied customers and regulators.
The situation began to change in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
however. Utility costs began to increase for reasons beyond their con-
trol, leading to rising utility rates. When utility demand forecasts, nu-
clear plant construction cost estimates, and changes in supply costs
made utilities' enormous investments in nuclear plants appear foolish
at best in the late 1970s, majoritarian bias appeared in regulatory deci-
sion making. "[T]he simple symbolism of anti-nuclear, anti-utility
rhetoric (e.g., 'staggering rate increases for dangerous white ele-
phants') facilitates media communications that activates the major-
ity."'164 After the long slumber of the 1950s and 1960s, the economic
crisis of the utility industry brought changes to both state and federal
regulatory law in the 1970s. State regulators began more aggressively
enforcing existing state laws and state legislatures responded to public
outcry with new limits on utilities. At the national level, federal policy
shifted in favor of deregulation (e.g., the Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978165) and increased federal intervention in state regulatory affairs
(e.g., the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978166). Utilities
sought relief in the courts; as in Barasch they were not always success-
ful. The federal statutory framework changed significantly during the
general deregulatory climate of the late 1970s and 1980s.
Pierce's survey of utility regulatory decisions disallowing costs
found the astonishing result that the total of all disallowances before
1983 "probably did not exceed a few hundred million dollars"'167 while
disallowances between 1984 and 1988 produced more than $11.6 bil-
160. Id.
161. Hammond, supra note 124, at 86.
162. See Uhler, supra note 25, at 78-79.
163. Bonbright complained that in Britain, unlike in the United States, a government com-
mission would be appointed to address cost allocation issues. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 368;
see also Uhler, supra note 25, at 79.
164. Pierce, Public Utility Regulatory Takings, supra note 156, at 2049.
165. 15 U.S.C. § § 3301-3432 (1994) (codifying gradual decontrol of interstate gas prices).
166. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 16, 30,
42 and 43 U.S.C.) (mandating considerations of particular rate structures by state regulators,
including the cost-of-service basis for rates, time-of-day rates, seasonal rates, and other load
management rate structures).
167. Pierce, Public Utility Regulatory Takings, supra note 156, at 2050.
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lion in disallowances. As Pierce concludes, if the agencies' findings of
imprudent investment are to be believed
that is, if the findings of the [1984-88 period] are something other
than a guise for politically opportunistic exercises of raw political
power to redistribute wealth from a minority to the majority-then
they suggest a startling trend in the industry's management. Appar-
ently, for decades electric utility managers were almost uniformly
individuals with outstanding business acumen. At some point in the
1980s, this entire generation of exceptional managers was replaced
en masse by a generation of bumbling idiots. 168
Pierce's survey suggests that utility regulation has shifted between
majoritarian and minoritarian biases, never free from the political ma-
nipulations that steer regulatory decisions away from efficient out-
comes even under a first-best analysis. 169
Political constraints play an important role in determining the
ability of regulators to respond even if they possess both the under-
standing and desire to implement particular policies. For example,
Richard Pierce analogized the task facing the Federal Energy Regulat-
ing Commission ("FERC") in restructuring the electric utility industry
to Mikhail Gorbachev's effort to implement perestroika. "Any
change will displease powerful constituencies and will bring down on
FERC the wrath of those constituencies' representatives in the House
and Senate.' 170
II. PROBLEMS
Utility regulation presents a paradox. On the one hand, utility
regulation in theory (and the "problem" of a natural monopoly in gen-
eral) is so straightforward as to be uninteresting. Simply set utility
prices to marginal cost or some alternative like Ramsey pricing, and
allow the market to work. If these solutions ignore second-best
problems, they are far from unique in the catalogue of economists'
policy prescriptions. On the other hand, utility regulation in practice
168. Id. at 2050-51.
169. Political considerations can play a significant role in the structure of regulatory solu-
tions. In the United Kingdom, for example, the government pushed an electricity privatization
plan through in 1988 despite solid evidence that the plan's creation of a duopoly would signifi-
cantly impede the development of competition. The duopoly plan had been designed as a bribe
to investors to induce them to purchase British nuclear plants by pairing the nuclear plants with
a sixty percent share of non-nuclear generator capacity. When the bribe proved insufficient, the
sixty-forty division of non-nuclear capacity was implemented anyway because the approaching
general election left inadequate time to change the implementing legislation. The government
feared it would lose the next election, preventing privatization at all, and so proceeded to create
a duopoly rather than risk continuing state ownership. See MARK ARMSTRONG ET AL., REGULA-
TORY REFORM: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 290-95 (1994).
170. Pierce, Unintended Effects, supra note 122, at 10.
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is highly political, and its history demonstrates alternating mi-
noritarian and majoritarian biases. Courts' attempts to involve them-
selves in regulatory review ultimately led to abandonment of review
as the doctrinal tools proved unworkable. The legal tools available to
constrain regulators are inadequate in practice. If something so theo-
retically straightforward is incapable of effective regulation to accom-
plish even relatively clear first-best policies, then the ability to achieve
the technically more demanding policies demanded by second-best
analysis appear impossible. The three interconnected factual asser-
tions identified earlier form the foundation of the regulatory state: (1)
technical expertise can design solutions to social problems; (2) legal
constraints can ensure technical expertise is properly applied; and (3)
political constraints will produce legal constraints which correctly
guide and restrain technical experts. In this section I will explore the
treatment of second-best concerns in utility regulation, and then dis-
cuss why these three factual assertions are false.
A. Second-Best Considerations in Utility Regulation
The first premise of the regulatory state is that technical expertise
can construct solutions to social problems ranging from natural mo-
nopoly to externalities. This is promoted by the "engineering" 171 view
of economics which dominates much of economic analysis-given the
appropriate information to plug into the variables in a model, we sim-
ply maximize/minimize/optimize our way to a first-best outcome. Sec-
ond-best theory profoundly challenges this view of the world. If there
is no reason to believe that removing a subset of all distortions will
lead us closer to a social optimum, of what use are the models, opti-
mums, and conditions which remove those distortions and which were
so painstakingly calculated and proven?
Economists have had four types of reactions to second-best the-
ory in connection with public utility regulation. 172 The most common
171. As someone who regularly teaches engineers, this characterization may be unfair to the
engineering profession. Consider just one example of the differences between much of the util-
ity economics literature and engineering: unlike scholars in utility economics, and law and eco-
nomics in general, engineers usually have data to test their analyses.
172. Lipsey and Lancaster's paper also led to extensive literature addressing technical points
in their analysis and discussing the generality of their results and the policy implications. See P.
Bohm, On the Theory of "Second Best," 34 REV. ECON. STUD. 301 (1967); O.A. Davis & Andrew
B. Whinston, Piecemeal Policy in the Theory of Second Best, 34 REV. ECON. STUD. 323 (1967)
[hereinafter Davis & Whinston, Piecemeal Policy]; O.A. Davis & Andrew B. Whinston, Welfare
Economics and the Theory of Second Best, 32 REV. ECON. STUD. 1 (1965) [hereinafter Davis &
Whinston, Welfare Economics]; M. McManus, Comments on the General Theory of Second Best,
26 REV. ECON. STUD. 209 (1959); M. McManus, Private and Social Costs in the Theory of Second
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response is to ignore the issue. Thus, many economists continue con-
structing partial-equilibrium models of electricity demand, arguing for
and against particular pricing schemes or regulatory actions without
discussing whether their proposals make sense in a world in which the
deviation of utility product prices from marginal cost is not the only
distortion.173 For example, one former federal regulator ended his
1983 summary of pricing issues by concluding that
[tihe issue for the 1980s is not to debate the merits of marginal-cost
pricing or time-of-day rates-ideas articulated by Bonbright two de-
cades ago and clearly understood by the industry experts of today.
The issue for the 1980s is to reaffirm Bonbright's three primary cri-
teria for sound rate making-revenue adequacy, optimal use of ser-
vice, and fairness-and doggedly pursue marginal-cost pricing as a
means to achieve those time-honored ends.1 74
Similarly, Brown and Sibley begin their 1986 text on utility pricing by
listing the important policy issues that arose after Kahn's 1970 trea-
tise: (1) the rationale for declining block tariffs, cross-subsidization,
(2) the size of efficiency gains from Ramsey pricing and other non-
uniform price schemes, and (3) the design of optimal tariffs.175 When
they do take up some second-best considerations (although without
reference to Lipsey and Lancaster) related to the impact of non-uni-
form prices on downstream business customers, Brown and Sibley fo-
cus on reasons why second-best implications can be ignored. 76 By
failing to take second-best issues into account, however, these analy-
ses forfeit the ability to rely on social efficiency as a justification.
The second response is to deny the correctness of Lipsey and
Lancaster's analysis. For example, in a 1971 essay economists Eirik G.
Best, 34 REv. ECON. STUD. 317 (1967); T. Negishi, The Perceived Demand Curve in the Theory of
Second Best, 34 REV. ECON. STUD. 315 (1967).
173. See, e.g., PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC UTILrrY ECONOMICS AND REGULATION, supra note 72,
(volume containing nine essays on such topics as the costs and benefits of time of day electricity
rates, utility rate price structure, and peak load pricing, while not even including Lipsey and
Lancaster in its bibliography); Charles F. Phillips, Jr., Utility Pricing: Some Theoretical and Prac-
tical Considerations, in COMPETITION IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES 79 (James F. Niss & Michael
T. Pledge eds., 1975) ("If economic efficiency is the goal, the marginal or incremental cost is the
proper measure of cost."); BROWN & SIBLEY, supra note 6, at 27 (defining "efficient prices" as
"those which lead to a maximum of consumer surplus plus producer surplus" without mention-
ing second-best issues.); id. at 65 (claiming non-uniform price schedules "can make all consumers
and the firm better off" than uniform pricing based on partial equilibrium analysis.); id. at 97
(discussing "Pareto dominating incentive compatible" tariffs based on partial equilibrium
results).
174. Uhler, supra note 25, at 81-82.
175. See BROWN & SIBLEY, supra note 6, at 1-3.
176. See, e.g. id. at 158 ("as the distribution of firm types becomes continuous, these mul-
timarket equilibrium effects turn out to be of second-order importance .... [ O]ne may be able to
assume that the effects of tariff changes on the number of firms in each downstream industry are
small enough to ignore.").
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Furubotn and Thomas R. Saving argued Lipsey and Lancaster were
"wrong"'177 and concluded that "there is no general theory of second
best unless it is that you can, in general, say nothing. ' 178 Correctly
noting that Lipsey and Lancaster's result did not preclude the removal
of a subset of distortions from producing welfare enhancements,
Furubotn and Saving contended Lipsey and Lancaster's result
implies nothing about the likelihood of a particular problem yield-
ing results that require the remaining first-best conditions to be met
(or violated). In fact, it would be entirely possible (that is, not in
contradiction to the theorem) that in every economics problem in
which an additional constraint is imposed that prevents the attain-
ment of one of the first-best conditions, optimization will require
the retention of all of the remaining first-best conditions.179
Moreover, although Furubotn and Saving concede there are some
problems in making confident predictions about policies, particularly
with respect to distributional questions, 180
[a]ll this makes for some difficulty in applying second-best theory to
practical policy problems. Since the significance of any given set of
constraints will vary with the structure of the economic model to
which the set is applied, we can never gauge the effects of con-
straints accurately unless fairly detailed information on the struc-
ture of the total system is available. Yet, even assuming the basic
structural conditions for the second-best problem are met, second-
best theory need not be particularly useful. For example, in the case
of industrial pricing policy, the general theorem merely tells us that,
depending on the nature and pattern of the constraints extant, opti-
177. Eirik G. Furubotn & Thomas R. Saving, The Theory of the "Second-best" and the Effi-
ciency of Marginal Cost Pricing, in EsSAYS ON PUBLIC UTILITY PRICING AND REGULATION 31
(Harry M. Trebing ed., 1971). Although their entire argument is too lengthy to be repeated here,
they summarize their critique of Lipsey and Lancaster as follows:
First, the question of the existence of a second-best solution was treated in a highly
misleading way; there can be no general presumption that a second-best solution (even
an interior solution) is unlikely to occur. If a first-best solution exists, then the imposi-
tion of an additional constraint that does not contradict the original constraint does not,
in general, result in no solution. Second, the generality of the conclusion that Paretian
optimum conditions are not retained in a second-best solution was overstated. If one of
the first-best optimum conditions cannot be met, the normal outcome is not that all
other first-best equilibrium conditions are undesirable. In many types of optimization
problems considered by economists, the inability to meet one or more specific first-best
conditions does not imply that the second-best optimum will require violation of the
remaining first-best conditions. Frequently, the second-best will simply demand that
the first-best conditions be met wherever feasible.
Id. at 31-32 (footnotes omitted).
178. Id. at 36.
179. Id. at 34 (footnotes omitted).
180. Without a value judgment on distribution, "the case for marginal cost pricing is stripped
of its former authority. Yet insofar as the ideal distribution of welfare is unknown (and possibly
unknowable), it can be urged that the best policy is to accept some plausible distribution provi-
sionally and optimize with respect to it." Id. at 59
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mal adjustment may involve marginal cost pricing by some or none
of the individual sectors in the economy.181
As a result, they conclude that
in the absence of any clear knowledge of what the ideal distribution
is, the best course of action is to follow the conventional marginal
rules and optimize relative to some provisionally accepted distribu-
tion. Then, we know that marginal cost pricing can benefit every-
one relative to any other policy for the chosen distribution.182
This response is simply wrong.
The third response is to accept Lipsey and Lancaster's result as a
challenge to do better, albeit not a particularly important challenge
worthy of much effort.183 Alfred Kahn, the intellectual father of most
of modem regulatory economics, 184 took this position in his now-clas-
sic treatise The Economics of Regulation. Kahn addressed second-
best issues at the end of the first, "positive" volume, along with sev-
eral other issues, in a chapter entitled "Qualifications." After summa-
rizing the problem, Kahn set out what he saw as the important
implications of the second-best problem for regulators:
This general proposition means that, as a matter of pure economics,
adoption of any particular economic policy on the basis of the rules
we have expounded could well end up doing more harm than good
in practice. But the observation applies equally well to the policy of
having no policy. Most economists would draw the conclusion, from
this dilemma, that a conscious policy is better than an unconscious
one; that, therefore, the important contribution of the theory of the
second-best is not that it recommends a policy of no policy but that
it emphasizes the need for considering, as best as one can, the impli-
cations for any particular policy of the presence of suboptimal con-
ditions elsewhere in the economy; and that as a practical matter itis
not impossible to make informed judgments about the ways in
which the most directly relevant imperfections elsewhere might sug-
gest modification of the rules. In short, here as elsewhere, there is
no substitute for judgment when one comes to the job of applying
our principles-judgment in identifying the imperfections elsewhere
that bear most directly on the wisdom of the policy under considera-
181. Id. at 58.
182. Id. at 57.
183. This reaction is similar to the general responses to Lipsey and Lancaster's paper that
concentrated on showing that piecemeal policies could still increase welfare in certain circum-
stances. For example, Davis and Whinston argued that "where only prices and the variables
under the deviant's control enter into his decision rule, then the market takes [the deviations
from the behavioral rules necessary for Pareto optimally] into account. In such situations 'piece-
meal policy' is all that is required." Davis & Whinston, Welfare Economics, supra note 172, at
12.
184. See McCRAw, supra note 80, at 230-59.
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tion and in deciding in what way those imperfections counsel modi-
fication of that policy. 185
Kahn's emphasis on contrasting a policy of "no policy" with marginal
cost pricing echoes Furubotn and Saving's argument that it is just as
likely that removing a distortion will improve welfare as reduce it.
Kahn identifies the "most obvious" relationships worthy of con-
sideration as "between prices and marginal social costs of close substi-
tutes, complementary products, or products using the public utility
service as input. '186 Although Kahn concludes that "[t]he decision
about what kinds of modifications second-best considerations recom-
mend can be made only by looking at the facts in each individual
case,"'187 he suggests the somewhat surprising conclusion that the re-
sult of considering second-best issues is likely to "strengthen the gen-
eral case for adopting first-best pricing of public utility services"'188
and that "[oln balance second-best considerations probably argue
more often for pricing utility services below marginal cost than
above."' 189 This view is also implicit in Bonbright's 1960 treatise on
utility ratemaking, whose theme was that "sound ratemaking policy is
a policy of reasonable compromise among partly conflicting objec-
tives."'190 While better than simply ignoring the issues, this reaction
rests on the empirically unsupported claim that second-best considera-
tions are largely unimportant. Until there is evidence based on a com-
bination of careful theoretical work and empirical investigations, this
claim is little different from Furubotn and Saving's more general re-
jection of Lipsey and Lancaster.
The fourth reaction is the interpretation of Lipsey and Lancas-
ter's results as an argument for more extensive regulation. For exam-
ple, one economist concluded an analysis of the problem of
sustainability of Ramsey pricing by noting that "the existence of natu-
ral monopoly and a zero-profit constraint for any subset of goods in
the economy argues in favor of a large number of goods in the regu-
lated set, regardless of demand interrelationships.''
185. KAHN, supra note 8, at 196.
186. Id. at 196.
187. Id. at 198.
188. Id. at 197.
189. Id. at 198.
190. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at viii.
191. Almarin Phillips, Ramsey Pricing and Sustainability with Interdependent Demands, in
REGULATED INDUSTRIES AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISE, supra note 11, at 201. In addition to explicit
calls like Phillips', a number of calls for expanded regulation made implicit second-best argu-
ments; see also Rosenberg, supra note 45, at 63-68 (arguing in 1974 for federally insured and
guaranteed financing for utility construction because of depressed stock. prices, energy prices
increases, inflation, and competition for capital).
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Common to all four reactions is a lack of attention to second-best
considerations. They simply have not played a major role in economic
regulation, raising the question of why they have not. One reason is
that the second-best literature is dense and difficult to read. A second
reason is that the second-best literature itself is unable to clearly de-
fine the "problem" of second best, let alone how to resolve the prob-
lem. 192 A third reason is the timing of the spread of ideas-just as
second-best issues began to be discussed in the utility-regulation liter-
ature, 193 utility regulation was turned upside down by the events of
the early 1970s. In the ensuing scramble to create policy responses to
the new conditions, relatively theoretical issues-particularly ones
which raised what still appear to be unanswerable objections to con-
ventional approaches-could easily be lost.
All four reactions significantly undermine the efficiency rationale
for regulation. Commenting on Furubotn and Saving in 1969, Richard
Lipsey set out a clear statement of the requirements of his earlier
work with Lancaster, a statement which applies equally well to all four
types of responses described above:
What the theory of second-best still requires is the specification of
economic situations in which we are interested, a translation of
these into relevant constraints, and a study of the relation between
the [first best optimum conditions] and the [second best optimum
conditions] in the particular issues so defined. It also needs addi-
tional empirical information about situations in which the behavior
of a sector that can be influenced by policy does or does not influ-
ence behavior in sectors in which the [first best optimum con-
straints] cannot be fulfilled. Until we can narrow the range of
possible cases empirically we still seem to be left with the original
conclusion of [Lipsey and Lancaster] .... 194
Lipsey's formulation of the requirements of second-best policy go well
beyond the application of the regulator's and/or economist's (or, even
better, economist-regulator's) judgment that Bonbright and Kahn pre-
scribe. Indeed, Bonbright's and Kahn's positions seem to be in the
end a plea for more deference to regulators (or at least regulators who
understand economics)-we are to defer to the judgment of regula-
tors not only in choosing rules to be implemented (such as marginal
192. See generally Davis & Whinston, Piecemeal Policy, supra note 172, at 330 (noting dis-
agreements with others); SHERMAN, supra note 52, at 124 (labelling as second-best prices those
where "the enterprise must depart from ideal marginal cost prices for some accepted reason,
such as to avoid too great a financial loss, and does so in a way that minimizes the consequent
loss in economic welfare..." and using Ramsey pricing as an example).
193. See, e.g., Furubotn & Saving, supra note 177 (published in 1971).
194. Richard G. Lipsey, Comment, in ESSAYS ON PUBLIC UTILrTY PRICING AND REGULA-
TION, supra note 177, at 68.
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cost pricing) but also in choosing when to deviate from the rules them-
selves. This is an important distinction; one virtue of a rule such as
marginal cost pricing is that it constrains regulators at least a little
from action which produce rents (e.g. cross-subsidies) and that virtue
is lost when we grant regulators the broad discretion advocated by
Bonbright and Kahn. While the effectiveness of the marginal cost
constraint is debatable, it is certainly at least greater than discretion-
ary authority to pursue the regulator's own judgment in deciding
whether there are other imperfections, whether those imperfections
justify departure from the rule, and the form of the deviation the im-
perfections require.
B. Technical Expertise
Regulation requires three types of technical expertise. First, reg-
ulators must understand the goals of regulation. Second, regulators
must understand how to implement the means of achieving those
goals. Third, regulators must have the information available to effec-
tively implement those means.
The goals of natural monopoly regulation under a first-best anal-
ysis are relatively straightforward: gain the efficiencies made possible
by the natural monopoly characteristics while avoiding the problems
of allowing a monopoly to operate. In practice, however, deriving the
first-best outcome is more difficult than this simple formulation sug-
gests. Even in the relatively clear-cut case of a natural monopoly, the
ultimate goal of regulation is unclear in practice. In particular, who
will receive the benefits gained by regulation is open to question. 195
As with price, economists have a straightforward answer: maximize
consumer surplus. 196 As with the marginal cost pricing rule, the rule's
statement is simpler than its implementation. 197 For example, many
utility services have significant quality characteristics which will be af-
fected by regulatory action. Electricity available twenty-four hours
per day, for example, is different from electricity that is periodically
unavailable. The introduction of non-price rationing of service re-
quires a more sophisticated analysis that introduces additional as-
195. See Vogelsang, supra note 71, at 11-12.
196. See id. at 12; BROWN & SIBLEY, supra note 6, at 27.
197. See Vogelsang, supra note 71, at 12. Vogelsang suggests "hypothetical voting proce-
dures" to select regulatory goals and notes that "[m]aximizing consumers' or social surplus as an
official goal might tremendously reduce subsequent conflicts if measurement problems could
only be overcome." Id. at 12 n.5.
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sumptions about consumer behavior. 198 Another complication is
introduced by allowing joint production of the regulated good and un-
regulated goods, as in the case of industrial co-generation of electric-
ity. Forbidding such production eliminates potential cost savings and
allowing it complicates regulatory action.199 Implementing marginal
cost pricing requires the capacity to vary costs over time to smooth
peak loads, thus reducing the need for additional generation capacity,
but implementing peak load pricing is expensive and requires sophisti-
cated regulatory structures to realize efficiencies.2°° Metering costs
also pose a barrier to marginal cost pricing.20 1 Even where technolog-
ical advances have permitted more accurate measured service (for ex-
ample of local telephone service), concerns over the distributional
effects of switching from flat-rate to metered service have delayed im-
plementation of the technology.20 2
The Hope framework presented several problems for first-best
utility pricing'
the input determining allowed profit and capital is an object of
choice for the utility, so that choice may be biased; outputs may be
inefficiently chosen because monopolistic motives remain in the
utility to influence rate structure; and setting allowed profit by Hope
methods interferes with the residual role of profit and distorts risk
bearing and oversight functions of investors. 20 3
Solutions to these problems typically involved schemes of increasing
complexity. One analyst, for example, proposed a combination of reg-
ulatory rules, which he conceded were "not .. .very encouraging
when studied singly," that involved industry-based target costs "ad-
justed skillfully to make a target reasonably suited to a particular
firm's circumstances," allowed profit based on "an output mixture
198. See Ray Rees, Consumer Choice and Nonprice Rationing in Public Utility Pricing, in
REGULATED INDUSTRIES AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISE, supra note 11, at 227.
199. See Paul L. Joskow, Industrial Cogeneration and Electricity Production in the United
States, in REGULATORY REFORM AND PUBLIC UTILITIES, supra note 23, at 96; JUrgen Miller,
Industrial Self-Generation of Electricity in a Public System, in REGULATED INDUSTRIES AND PUB-
LIC ENTERPRISE, supra note 11, at 244-45.
200. See Jan Paul Acton & Bridger M. Mitchell, Evaluating Time-of-Day Electricity Rates for
Residential Customers, in REGULATED INDUSTRIES AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISE, supra note 11, at
271-72.
201. See Michael A. Crew & Robert D. Dansby, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Local Measured
Service, in REGULATORY REFORM AND PUBLIC UTILITIES, supra note 23, at 35.
202. See id. at 35, 59 n.2. Crew and Dansby quote a critic who argued that local measured
telephone service "poses the threat of being the most massively regressive piece of social engi-
neering that the nation has ever seen." Id.
203. Sherman, supra note 114, at 62.
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that is fixed and unaffected by currently chosen prices," and a modi-
fied Ramsey-pricing rule.2°4
Second-best theory suggests important modifications of these
goals. In a world with many imperfections, successful regulation re-
quires not simply ensuring efficient operation of the natural monopoly
itself but efficient operation of its suppliers and customers. To the
extent there are significant imperfections affecting those, the regulator
must adjust the regulation of the natural monopoly.
This characterization still understates the problem, however.
When a technology is static, simply implementing a pricing rule may
be adequate. When a technology has the potential to change in ways
which alter the boundaries of the natural monopoly, and which may
call into question the entire notion of a natural monopoly, even un-
derstanding the goal is difficult. To take but one example, the "local
loop" portion of the telephone network in the United States consists
largely of twisted pair copper wire. The limitations of this portion of
the network significantly restrict the ability to make use of new serv-
ices which require greater bandwidth (e.g., Internet access at reason-
able speeds for downloading video or audio). The obsolete local loop
can be replaced by higher capacity cabling or by non-wired services.
With additional technology costing less than rewiring the local loop,
for example, the networks of many cable companies could also pro-
vide local telephone service and also offer additional services more
cost-effectively than the local phone companies. How should regula-
tors compensate the former natural monopoly local telephone com-
pany for its "stranded" investment in the twisted pair network?
The answer is significant for the investors in the former natural
monopoly and its new competitors. It will also have an important im-
pact on the rate of technological change beyond the telecommunica-
tions industry since the availability of a high-bandwidth pipeline into
businesses and homes will enable new services (most trivially, video
on demand). The existence of these services will, in turn, produce
restructurings of existing industries (video rental stores, consumer
electronics).
Implementation is even more difficult. In a first-best world, regu-
lators theoretically need only implement the currently accepted rem-
edy (e.g. marginal cost pricing, RPI-X regulation, etc.). Second-best
considerations complicate this analysis even more than they compli-
cate the goals. If pricing must reflect not only the costs of, and tech-
204. Id. at 65.
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nological change implications for, the regulated natural monopoly but
also the impact on other industries based upon non-utility related im-
perfections in the economy, pricing formulas will inevitably grow
more complex.
Even if such formulas could be calculated and could be relied
upon to remain stable for a reasonable period of time, implementing a
second-best pricing rule would require much more extensive data than
the analogous first-best pricing rule. Because utility regulators have
proven incapable of adequately amassing the information necessary to
implement marginal cost pricing, it is unlikely they could amass the far
greater data required for an adequate second-best solution.
It is possible to design legal rules that consider second-best the-
ory's implications in some areas.20 5 In the case of efficiency-based
regulation of natural monopolies, however, it may not be. The infor-
mation necessary to properly analyze the problem would be both diffi-
cult and expensive to gather in a sufficiently timely fashion. Assuming
that technology will solve that problem suggests central planners' re-
sponse to the socialist calculation problem. Suppose, however, that
technology provides sufficient computational power that a solution
can be calculated. Even then, however, we must consider how to im-
plement any solution, which brings us to the legal constraints we can
impose on regulators.
C. Legal Constraints
If the fundamental problem of administrative law is to constrain
the exercise of discretion by administrative agencies, utility regulation
reflects a significant area of failure. First, the legal environment is
necessarily incomplete; a regulatory rule covering all possible states of
the world would be impossibly expensive to specify.20 6 As a result, the
regulatory regime must inevitably leave significant terms unspecified,
heightening the importance of constitutional constraints. Second, the
Supreme Court's abdication of constitutional review of rate regula-
tion, combined with its general retreat from review of agency action
encompassed in the Chevron doctrine, leaves only the more transient
restrictions imposed through substantive provisions of regulatory stat-
utes to contain agency discretion. Perhaps more importantly, the reg-
ulated community is no longer smaller than the regulators. Energy
205. See, e.g., Richard S. Markovits, The Causes and Policy Significance of Pareto Resource
Misallocation: A Checklist for Micro-Economic Policy Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1976).
206. See Vogelsang, supra note 71, at 15-16.
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utilities are increasingly not only providing multiple types of energy
but also providing them across state and even national boundaries.207
Telecommunications utilities are expanding into new services and into
international markets. 20 8 As these "natural monopolies" become di-
versified, international entities, it will become increasingly difficult for
state and national regulatory schemes to constrain their behavior. 20 9
There is more to the problem than these significant hurdles to
regulation, however. Each of these could be addressed by more so-
phisticated regulatory schemes, perhaps not wholly successfully but
nonetheless partially successfully. There is a second-best problem
lurking here as well. Recall that Lipsey and Lancaster's original in-
sight focused on the possibility that individual departures from opti-
mum conditions might "cancel out," making the removal of one
distortion lead to a decrease in social welfare. The same may be true
of flaws in a regulatory scheme.
For example, suppose that the optimal regulatory scheme in-
volved a wise lawyer-economist (and of course all lawyer-economists
are wise) endowed not only with perfect knowledge of all relevant
factual information concerning the utility in question, but completely
devoid of self-interest and so devoted to his regulatory task that no
bribe or other inducement could lead to even the slightest deviation
from implementing the ideal regulatory scheme. Suppose further that
our omniscient social planner (",Fred") was required to operate under
a state administrative procedures act similar to Ohio's in implement-
ing his regulatory scheme.
If Fred were offered the chance to exchange Ohio administrative
law for the 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act (a law
designed by experts and undoubtedly superior to the Ohio law), social
welfare would no doubt be enhanced by the exchange. In a world of
multiple imperfections in regulators, however, this may not be true.
207. See, e.g., Emory Thomas, Jr., South Western Electricity PLC Accepts Southern's $1.7
Billion Takeover Offer, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 1995, at A5 (describing how American utility
purchased British utility).
208. See, e.g., John J. Keller et al., Phone Tag: BT Secures Its Place Among Telecom Titans
with MCI Takeover, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 1996 at Al (describing purchase of MCI by British
Telecomm).
209. In response to the FCC's Carterphone decision, for example, the Bell System began a
creative strategy of obstruction centered around the requirement of a Bell-supplied buffer be-
tween the network and the third-party equipment-leading to complaints about cost, technical
limitations, and delays in obtaining the buffers, a series of studies, disputes over the effect on
revenue, and inter-jurisdictional disputes between state and federal regulators. See Ende, supra
note 11, at 75-76.
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Avoiding an Ohio-like provision for legislative review of rules210 may
be a good thing under Fred; under a public utility commission subject
to minoritarian bias, review by a majoritarian institution might be wel-
fare increasing. Chevron-style deference to agency's interpretation of
"their" statutes might affect biases introduced by flaws in the legisla-
tive process, or it might not. Just as a thorough second-best analysis of
an economic problem requires a level of analysis beyond that usually
applied,211 so too analysis of the administrative law issues in imple-
menting a regulatory scheme must go beyond the partial equilibrium
analysis of the law. For example, it is not enough to consider whether
administrative law judges should be organized in a manner similar to
federal judges (with some form of tenure, independence, etc.) or as
agency employees based on general jurisprudential concerns;21 2 one
must also consider the details of the regulatory scheme they will be
implementing. Just as the degree of monopoly in a customer's market
may be relevant to a decision on the antitrust policy toward monopo-
listic behavior by a supplier,213 so too might considerations about the
concentration of political power in a regulated community (and per-
haps in its customers and suppliers) be relevant when considering the
need to insulate agency adjudicators from political pressure by agency
policymakers.
Unfortunately, both the constitutional and statutory constraints
fall short of permitting this type of analysis. Constitutional constraints
operate at a relatively high level of generality: the takings clauses pro-
tect all property, not particular types of property. Indeed, their power
comes from this generality: if the takings clauses did not protect all
property, evading them would become much easier, because a court
would merely need to define the protected category in a manner to
exclude the property in question. When the courts have attempted to
give these constraints sufficient content to address more specific is-
sues, as in the Smyth era, they have been strikingly unsuccessful.
Statutory constraints are also inadequate, although for different
reasons. When legislators give regulators specific instructions, they
generally do so in response to the biases which an omniscient social
planner would want the constraints to solve (e.g., the "used and use-
210. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.03 (H), (I) (Anderson 1994).
211. See, e.g., Markovits, supra note 205.
212. See, e.g., Richard B. Hoffman & Frank P. Cihlar, Judicial Independence: Can It Be With-
out Article I11?, 46 MERCER L. REv. 863 (1995).
213. See, e.g., Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best Theory and The Standard Analysis of Mo-
nopoly Rent Seeking: A Generalizable Critique, a "Sociological" Account, and Some Illustrative
Stories, 78 IOWA L. REv. 327 (1993).
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ful" utility statute in Duquesne). Conversely, when they do not pro-
vide specific instructions, they create opportunities for minoritarian
biases (e.g., the utility situation in the 1950s and 1960s). Legislation is
a strikingly poor instrument to solve the type of problems illuminated
by public choice analysis-an unsurprising result since relying on leg-
islation is essentially asking legislatures to self-regulate. Moreover, to
the extent legislatures themselves are not constrained by constitu-
tional doctrines from making contradictory delegations of authority,
political pressures may lead to muddled regulatory frameworks.
Solving these problems is complex. To take account of second-
best problems requires more than simply identifying an offsetting im-
perfection 214-it requires a comprehensive analysis. Offsetting any
particular imperfection, of course, may or may not improve social wel-
fare because the additional knowledge that a particular imperfection
is offset does not provide sufficient information to assess the overall
welfare effects.
Suppose, however, that these problems are solvable-that despite
the difficulties in doing so, experts carefully draft statutory or consti-
tutional provisions that will lead regulators to undertake analyses in-
formed by second-best theory and produce the most efficient pricing
possible. Further suppose that the expert drafters are capable of de-
signing an administrative process that has just the right incentives so
that no participant in the utility regulation debate (including the utili-
ties, consumers, labor organizations, environmental organizations,
lobbyists of assorted persuasions and abilities, business customers, ru-
ral cooperatives, equipment suppliers, proponents of alternative fuels,
and all the rest) is willing or able to make use of the mechanisms of
administrative law or judicial review to significantly degrade the per-
formance of the regulatory scheme. Would such a system be enacted
by a legislature? This brings us to the third problem area, political
institutions.
D. Political Institutions
The history of utility regulation suggests that a degree of pessi-
mism about the ability of political institutions to generate appropriate
legal constraints in this area is justified. Utility regulation's swing
from minoritarian to majoritarian bias reflects a fundamental truth
214. See generally Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administra-
tive State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (incorrectly
identifying as a second-best solution offsetting one constitutional imperfection with another
without a more general analysis).
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about the subject: because utility ratemaking is both complex and
dull, its ability to capture public attention is thus dependent on the
existence of politically charged symbols, like expensive, incomplete
nuclear power plants. The Economist, for example, concluded a re-
cent article on the slow progress of deregulation in the electric indus-
try by noting "[o]nly one (implausible) event might bring about rapid,
and real, competition: a sudden surge of interest by the average
American in his electricity bill. ' 215 Because such symbols appear spo-
radically at best, simply getting the attention of the public in this area
is difficult. In the absence of that attention, however, industries regu-
lated as natural monopolies are by definition concentrated interests
and hence a minoritarian bias is likely. Another indication of the fail-
ure of political institutions to generate appropriate legal constraints is
the continued assertion of the natural monopoly argument for utility
regulation, even as the underlying rationale underwent a complete re-
versal.216 Public choice theory in general suggests numerous reasons
to doubt the political system's ability to produce legal regimes capable
of "optimal" regulation, even under first-best analysis. It is difficult to
improve on the conclusion of a 1923 book: politics "stands ever in the
background as a counter-determinant, a potent factor working against
scientific regulation and one whose presence cannot be forgotten. '217
Once again, second-best considerations only make a bad solution
worse. There are remedies for at least some of the problems de-
scribed above-reforms from increasing public participation to de-
creasing public participation have advocates. A second-best solution
to the regulatory problem is unlikely to be prompted by such broad
reforms, however. Regulatory measures reformed by second-best the-
ory are likely to be more complex; rely on more difficult to collect and
interpret data, and so forth. Ultimately, deriving a second-best solu-
tion will require more deference to regulators, something likely to
worsen the first-best problems with the political system.
We might proceed from here by making assumptions like those
with which I ended the last two sections-our ideal economist-regula-
tors and legislative drafting committee might be joined by a legislature
of equally idealistic, technically competent legislators, a population of
voters similarly qualified, and so on. In such a society, of course, we
would not need any regulation to begin with (except perhaps as an
215. Chopping Up America's Power, THE ECONOMIST, May 3, 1997, at 21, 22.
216. See supra notes 164-172 and accompanying text.
217. MORGAN, supra note 75, at 81.
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intellectual exercise). A more rewarding next step is therefore to con-
sider the real world in which disinterested, objective, technically com-
petent analysis comes only from the pens of academics.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO REGULATION
There is a strong temptation to view second-best theory as an in-
vitation to reject economic analysis altogether. I believe this would be
a mistake, and not only because of my own considerable investment in
an economics education. Partial equilibrium analysis offers an impor-
tant tool for identifying pathways for human behavior, incentives for
particular types of actions, and such. The mistake lies not in perform-
ing the analysis but in considering the solution to the mathematical
model as directly translatable into public policy. Identifying the
Averch-Johnson effect, for example, is an important contribution to
regulatory analysis. However, it is a mistake to draw the policy con-
clusion from the proof of the Averch-Johnson effect that utilities
should be forced to reduce their investment in capital. The potential
existence of a bias toward over-investment is a valuable insight but it
can be implemented only by examining the totality of a utility's
environment.
Moreover, economics offers insights far beyond elegant mathe-
matical constructs-Ronald Coase's Problem of Social Cost218 is a
non-mathematical analysis which has had more influence (or is at least
more frequently cited) than any model or econometric effort; Fried-
rich Hayek's The Use of Knowledge in Society219 concisely summarizes
the comparative advantage of markets over central planning in a man-
ner which still repays extended consideration without a single equa-
tion. In approaching a problem such as utility regulation, therefore,
one must be aware of the limitations of first-best, partial equilibrium-
based analyses.
The dominant approach to the concerns raised by second-best
theory is to ignore them and continue to pursue policies at least nomi-
nally aimed at traditional, first-best solutions such as marginal cost
pricing. Although its social welfare effects are far from clear, this ap-
proach has an important virtue: it constrains regulators. If utility reg-
ulators are subject to capture, for example, constraining their policies
has certain virtues as a safeguard. The technical difficulties in actually
implementing such policies, particularly when confronting utilities
218. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
219. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REv. 519 (1945).
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which operate across regulatory jurisdictions and so have potential to
manipulate the "facts" upon which regulators base their actions, like
accounting and equipment location, suggest this is a limited benefit.
Utility regulators might attempt to conduct the factual and eco-
nomic analyses necessary to implement policies which take into ac-
count second-best considerations. Electric utility rates, for example,
for industrial customers might be varied according to the degree of
monopoly power the customer possessed in its product markets and
the importance of electricity costs to the customer's operations. Such
policies would face not only the technical problems of marginal cost
pricing but the costs of making utility ratemaking bodies even more
desirable as targets for regulatory capture. In addition, the rates they
produced would be difficult to explain to the public at large, again
enhancing the prospects for capture.
An alternative view of regulatory history suggests a different ap-
proach. George Priest concluded his survey of the theories of regula-
tion debate by noting that both forms of public utility regulation
widely used in the United States, municipal franchising and adminis-
trative commissions, could be seen as different types of long term, re-
lational-contracting. 220 A contractual approach would reposition
regulation into the same continuum of organizational forms which we
use to analyze the economic organization of unregulated transactions.
For example, regulators would need to consider whether particular
problems are best dealt with within a vertically integrated form or by
market purchase of goods. Most importantly, thinking of a regulatory
transaction as a contract would provide a framework for considering
issues such as an exit strategy for when the current organizational
form no longer suited conditions, and mechanisms to address issues of
opportunism, bounded rationality, and bilateral monopoly. Such a
framework would at least make clear the costs of the mechanisms cho-
sen. Thus, for example, a proposed monopoly of access to public
property to create a local loop would require more significant conces-
sions from the regulated entity than a proposal to share access with
other competitors. Whether such an approach would be feasible re-
quires further analysis (which the reader will undoubtedly be relieved
to learn, is not included here). Undoubtedly many of the same
problems identified above would hinder the creation of efficient con-
220. See Priest, supra note 6, at 323. Another similar argument, that regulatory rules gener-
ally "are simply the clauses of such a long-term contract" is made in Vogelsang, supra note 71, at
11.
1998]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
tracts. There would be, however, two significant advantages to such
an approach.
First, a contractual form would shift attention away from attempt-
ing to implement first-best solutions derived from partial equilibrium
analysis. One could not, for example, convince many people that a
contract which specified the utility's responsibility as selling its serv-
ices at marginal cost, Ramsey prices, or anything similar was a well
drafted contract. Second, lawyers and individuals generally are quite
good at drafting contracts. Building a regulatory structure around
something where there is a long record of success would be a positive
step, particularly when compared to the unimpressive record of regu-
lation of utilities.
Even if a contractual approach does not ultimately resolve all the
problems conventional utility regulation creates, there are some im-
portant lessons from second-best theory for regulators. The most im-
portant of these is that there ought to be a profound skepticism about
society's ability to dictate efficient solutions through regulation. By
removing the 'fig leaf' of regulators' presumed ability to optimize nat-
ural monopolies' behavior, regulatory policies such as cross-subsidiza-
tion would require explicit justification on their own merits. Instead
of accepting regulators' claims that they can produce efficiency (or
indeed any other, comparably large scale social goal) we ought to test
their claims against three criteria based on modesty, which correspond
to the three factual assertions I rejected earlier: (1) Technical mod-
esty; (2) legal modesty; and (3) political modesty.
(1) Technical modesty. There ought to be little room for solving
global optimization problems. Let us be honest about our limitations
and admit we do not know whether pricing utility services at marginal
cost, half marginal cost, twice marginal cost, or any other arbitrary
amount increases efficiency. Instead, those proposing regulatory ac-
tion ought to demonstrate that their proposals accomplish some read-
ily measurable goal.2 21
(2) Legal modesty. Administrative and regulatory law are at-
tempts to solve the problem of constraining the discretion of the ad-
221. In the contractual approach, for example, regulators instead would be expected to ac-
complish goals similar to those accomplished by private actors in the market. For example, they
might be asked to secure a package of basic electric or telephone service which could be
purchased for low income families. Not only could such a package be compared to the package
obtained by market participants, private charities would be able to negotiate better deals if regu-
lators failed to achieve a satisfactory solution, providing additional benchmarks and a market
test if the aid recipients opted for the privately produced package over the publicly provided
one.
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ministrative state enough to prevent abuses, inefficiency, and mistakes
while leaving the "experts" at agencies sufficient discretion to solve
the regulatory optimization problem, all the while balancing a com-
plex and often contradictory set of values encompassing public partici-
pation, due process, judicial independence, political accountability,
and more. In short, it is a messy, not particularly successful, often
incoherent and self-contradicting jumble. Public utility regulation em-
bodies all these flaws but it is by no means alone in doing So. 2 2 2
(3) Political modesty. The aggregation of individual preferences
through elections of any form is such a remarkably crude device that
we must be modest about the potential for the resulting political con-
straints to bear any relationship to those preferences. Encouraging
transparency provides one step toward more honesty about the results
of shifting decisions to political institutions rather than leaving them
to the market. Combined with vigorously enforced general rules to
protect against majoritarian bias, such an approach would avoid many
regulatory excesses.
Being modest about society's ability to regulate is not going to be
nearly as fun for the regulators or nearly as profitable for the regu-
lated. I suspect it will also lead to less regulation rather than more,
but that is a testable empirical prediction. 223 There may be cases
where a regulatory solution can genuinely enhance social welfare.
Identifying such cases only begins with partial equilibrium analysis
and will require the development of more sophisticated analytical
tools and compilation and analysis of a great deal more data. That
regulatory problems are hard no more excuses advocates of regulation
222. Contract law, on the other hand, is a comparatively clear, rational and comprehensible
body of law. Moving toward contract law can only increase the likelihood that we can accom-
plish our goals, particularly if those goals are modestly defined.
223. While I believe this would lead to a policy outcome I personally would find congenial
(extensive rejection of regulation), those beliefs represent my own evaluation of the public's true
preferences, an evaluation I am more than willing to test in the marketplace of ideas. In a now
relatively obscure essay on public utilities, Kenneth Boulding wrote
economic work on market power strikes me as dismal. We have concentrated on devel-
oping arbitrary measures of concentration and have neglected the sociology of market
power. Who is the bastard? That is the real question of market power; the economics
part of it is trivial. If an industry happens to have a bastard, we are all right. He won't
play; he'll cut prices and he won't go along with the boys and they won't let him join the
country club. The real question is, Who isn't in the country club? All this economic
numerology of market power is hardly worth the paper it written on. You have to look
at these things more subtly. I don't know what policy produces bastards, at least in the
sociological sense, but there is something in this which I am quite sure we can explore.
Kenneth E. Boulding, Entropy Economics, in PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION: CHANGE AND
SCOPE, supra note 11, at 11. Instead of searching for the solutions to optimization problems we
can never solve in the real world, we ought to concentrate on unleashing the "bastards" into
regulated industries.
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from providing those tools than the difficulty of an exam question
would excuse a student from focusing on the proper issues. Until such
tools and data are available, however, the debate over regulatory pol-
icy should be recognized to have little to do with economic efficiency.
We are in the middle of a significant restructuring of most public util-
ity industries in the United States and whether this restructuring pro-
duces prices closer to marginal cost or not is among the least relevant
and least interesting questions one might ask about it. We ought to
turn our attention to the political and distributional questions this re-
structuring raises rather than waste more time on first-best efficient
pricing debates.
